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I. INTRODUCTION
Banking companies in the United States have historically
performed three crucial functions: (i) facilitating the payments system;
(ii) acting as a trusted party; and (iii) acting as an intermediary between
borrowers and lenders. These functions are not mutually exclusive and
banks certainly play more than just these three roles in today's
economy. For example, today a bank must meet the demands of the
capital markets by creating "shareholder value" or risk a material
reduction in the market value of the firm and, potentially, an end to its
independent existence. Banks also have to face growing competition
from both traditional competitors and new players in the financial
services marketplace. The modem character of the financial services
industry compels banks to invest in technology and other business
infrastructure in order to meet the needs of their customers. It has also
forced banks to set priorities as to which businesses they want to be in
and which ones they will concede to other players. These and other
competitive factors have driven banks to enter into partnering
arrangements and other strategic alliances.
Banks are often criticized as being behemoth dinosaurs that are
victims of the innovations of smaller, faster and younger companies.
[Vol. 3
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This perception is not entirely baseless. There are instances where
banks have been surpassed in certain of their core businesses by more
innovative financial services companies. Specialty finance companies,
which have obtained funding through the securitization markets, have
taken a substantial slice of bank market share in the consumer loan
business. Investment banks have created a bewildering array of
innovative financing instruments to provide companies with direct
access to the institutional debt markets as an alternative to traditional
bank financing.
History shows us, however, that banks have often been
innovating leaders as they strive to perform their core businesses
better and with more convenience to their customers. Bank letters of
credit gave merchants the ability to freely purchase and sell goods in
cross-border transactions. Credit cards are one of the most commonly
used methods of payment for retail purchases of goods and services in
the world. Banks have been at the forefront of the development of the
products related to electronic commerce and electronic banking.
Banks have repeatedly found that, to turn innovations into
profits, they must often cooperate and ally with partners in other
industries and, frequently, with one another. These cooperative
arrangements have taken many forms. A common form is the creation
of a network, such as the Visa and MasterCard credit card networks,
national and regional clearinghouse systems such as ACH and CHIPS,
the various regional ATM networks and the supranational networks of
networks, such as the Cirrus system. Another common form of bank-
centered alliances are the standard-setting initiatives that resulted in the
standardization of numerous bank-to-bank payment protocols and,
more recently, electronic banking and commerce initiatives, such as
the Common Electronic Purse Specification (CEPS) for stored value
payment services' and the proposed Interactive Financial Exchange
(IFX) messaging specification for interoperable bill payment and
presentment systems.
2
1. See Jeffrey Kutler, Smart Cards: Wide Backing Is Claimed For Visa, Proton
Projects, AM. BANKER, Feb. 3, 1999, at 11.
2. The proposal came from the Banking Industry Technology Secretariat (BITS), a
division of the Bankers Roundtable, an organization of the 125 largest banks in the United
States, on February 2, 1999. See Group Invites Comments on IFX On-Line Banking
Standard, AM. BANKER, Feb. 5, 1999, at 11. It was reported that over 20 organizations
participated in the development of the standard, including a number of large banking
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Today's special challenges have also forced banks to engage in
one-on-one partnering arrangements with both bank and non-bank
partners and to enter into alliances with a limited number of other
financial institutions. Bank managements recognize that these
arrangements are becoming increasingly important in allowing banks
to excel in their core businesses. This article will focus on these new
breeds of bank alliances and will serve as a tool for bank executives
and that counsel in determining what types of alliances may best help a
particular institution to reach its business goals.
Today's one-on-one or multi-bank alliances are generally the
product of one or more of the following factors: (i) the desire to co-opt
certain opportunities of potential competitors; (ii) the need for
complementary resources; (iii) the desire to share risks of large
projects too big for a single bank; and (iv) the need to unite in order to
surmount barriers to markets and create economies of scale. 3 When
one or more of these factors are present, companies will often find
cooperative arrangements had better meet their needs than go-it-alone
strategies. 4
The strategic benefits of forming an alliance can be
compelling. Alliances are an expedient way to crack new markets,
gain skills, technology, or products and share fixed cost resources. 5
Through an alliance, a company is able to quickly access a range of
strategic assets, including complementary products and technology,
faster and cheaper than they could be developed internally. 6  Some
alliances are established to speed entry into a new market, to develop
and commercialize new products, or to gain skills and share costs.
7
The rate of return is often higher on strategic alliance activity
than the rate of return on other corporate activities. A Booz, Allen &
organizations, two joint ventures involving banks (Integrion Financial Network and
TransPoint), CheckFree Corp., and AT&T Corp. See id.
3. See JOSEPH L. BADAROCCO, THE KNOWLEDGE LINK: How FIRMS COMPETE
THROUGH STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 4 (1991).
4. See THOMAS F. VILLENEUVE ET AL., CORPORATE PARTNERING: STRUCTURING &
NEGOTIATING DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 1-6 (3rd ed. 1999).
5. See Joel BIeeke & David Ernst, The Way to Win in Cross Border Alliances,
HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 127.
6. See V. Scott Killingsworth, Strategic Licensing: Leveraging Technology Through
Alliances, CYBERSPACE LAW., Sept. 1998, at 13, available in WL, at 3 No.6 GLCYLAW
13.
7. See Bleeke & Ernst, supra note 5, at 127.
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Hamilton study found that the average return on strategic alliances is
17%. 8 The study also found that investments in strategic alliances
achieve 50% higher returns than the returns on the same company's
base assets. 9 At the same time, the failure rate for strategic alliances
is substantial. 'o
Strategic alliances (as our choice of name implies) tend to be
of the highest strategic importance to each party, although their
strategic goals and limitations may differ considerably. It is important
that each party fully understand its and the other parties' strategic
goals and limitations and business philosophies and how different
strategic alliance structures may either facilitate or hinder achievement
of these goals. Given the delicate nature of many alliances, it is
important (but often difficult) to strike a balanced deal that is
consistent with each party's strategies.
Although alliances are potentially valuable strategic tools for a
financial services firm, obtaining the benefit comes at the cost of
dealing with a number of critical business and legal issues that can
potentially constrain the firm, both as an alliance participant and as a
competitor generally.
Part I of this article will discuss in greater detail the different
strategic alternatives that banks must consider when considering
reaching outside of the bank to achieve a certain business objective.
Part II will outline in detail the principal forms of strategic alliances
and how each form may be suited to the bank's strategic objectives
and constraints. Finally, Part III will discuss certain legal and
regulatory considerations inherent in strategic alliances.
II. STRATEGIC RATIONALE
The reasons for forming strategic alliances are as diverse and
complex as the players themselves. The mix and weighting of these
8. See JOHN R. HARBISON AND PETER PEKAR, INSTITUTIONALIZING ALLIANCE SKILLS:
SECRETS OF REPEATABLE SUCCESS (1997).
9. See id.
10. See JOEL BLEEKE & DAVID ERNST, COLLABORATING TO COMPETE: USING
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 18 (1993)
[hereinafter COLLABORATING TO COMPETE]; Bleeke & Ernst, supra note 5, at 127. One
McKinney study found that fewer than one-third of alliances continue to operate after ten
years. See Bleeke & Ernst, supra note 5, at 131-35.
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strategic drivers in determining whether to enter an alliance are among
the most complex and sophisticated business decisions many
companies will ever make. " The reasons or drivers are both positive
and negative (or offensive and defensive, as we characterize them
here). In this Part, we will discuss certain offensive and defensive
drivers and illustrate how they may guide a company toward a
strategic alliance. Although not exhaustive, we believe this discussion
will illustrate the most common drivers that banks must grapple with
in today's economy, keeping in mind that multiple drivers may be
present in any alliance.
A. Operating Cost Reduction
In today's economy banks are more than ever conscious of the
bottom line. A common way to protect and enhance profits is to
reduce operating costs. The desire to reduce operating costs will drive
management to analyze which of its businesses, or services, could be
performed more cheaply and efficiently by employing either an outside
party with economies of scale to provide the service or an alternative
method of delivering the service. Once a business or service is
identified as being more expensive than necessary, management will
engage in a cost/benefit or risk/benefit analysis on whether to ally with
a third party to reduce costs.
A common operating cost reduction strategic alliance is a
service contract, or outsourcing, arrangement. Allying with a partner
that can reduce a firm's fixed or variable costs is one way to improve
a firm's bottom line. For example, outsourcing data processing (and
other) services can often be more cost effective than doing the work
in-house, as the vendor who will provide the service will have
economies of scale. Contracting certain jobs to outside providers
spreads the infrastructure and technology costs over a larger base of
transactions. Outsourcing lets smaller institutions offer more
sophisticated services than they could with their own in-house systems,
frees management from the worry that the loss of key personnel could
distress their own program, and may allow the bank to unload some
11. See Douglas G. Scrivner, Strategic Alliances in the 1990s, COMPUTER LAWYER,
Dec. 1992, at 24, 26.
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pending technological headaches, such as Year 2000 (Y2K) issues.
Increased use of technology through more integrated alliances
is another way firms can do what they do more efficiently. For
example, in the banking industry conducting a transaction with a teller
has an estimated cost to the bank of $1. Transactions conducted
through an ATM are estimated to reduce that cost to about a quarter,
while transactions conducted on the Internet are estimated to cost the
bank a penny." As you can see, these may be identical transactions
with identical revenue streams attached, yet the cost can be virtually
eliminated. By allying with a partner with access to beneficial
technology, a bank can increase its bottom line by lowering costs
using technology.'
3
Most cost reduction alliances result in a third party's access to
the bank's customers. Depending on the structure of the transaction,
this can be a negative driver. This driver is usually negligible in the
service contract arrangement because the customers are blind to the
existence of the third party and the third party is not a competitor. In
the ATM networks, however, that driver is more significant as the
bank's competitors will interact with the bank's customers every time
they use another bank's ATM. Most banks have found that the
positive drivers outweigh the negatives in this cost reduction mode.
B. Risk and Development Cost Sharing
Banks and other companies will often want to become involved
with a cutting-edge product or technology, but will be concerned about
incurring substantial development and costs without assurance of
recouping those costs, due to the product's or technology's uncertain
probability of success. A strategic alliance is often a way to spread
development costs and downside risk among a number of entities.
These drivers are often instrumental in a bank's decision to
form a strategic alliance with a technology firm. In addition to sharing
costs, each of the participants in an alliance reduces its economic risk
12. See John L. Douglas, Banking, Technology, and the Regulatory Environment:
Never Better, 2 ELEC. BANKING L. & COM. REP. 1 (1997).
13. See, e.g., Steven Marjanovic, Chase Forms Retail Lockbox Partnership, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 12, 1999, at 12 (reporting formation of joint venture with Regulus Group to
focus on lower-margin consumer-to-corporate remittance processing).
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of failure with regard to the alliance initiative. For example, a bank
and a technology firm may enter into an alliance because the
technology finm wishes to share the costs and risks of its product
development and the bank wants to engage in a new technology, but
may wish to avoid the cost of establishing a potentially fruitless
independent research effort. This is frequently a motivation for co-
branded product alliances offered by firms with different skill sets.
14
An element of risk and development cost sharing is the choice
of technology risk (for example, which bill payment and presentment
platform to choose). The risk of failure associated with developing the
ultimately second place company's technology can be minimized with
an alliance. To further spread this risk, banks may enter more than
one alliance focusing on the same technology. 15
C. Network Effects
To the extent network effects are important, the degree of
exclusivity will be affected. For example, fax machines are relatively
useless unless there is widespread use of the product in the
marketplace. Similarly, without widespread use and acceptance of
certain technologies, such as credit, debit, and smart cards, the ability
to market and profit from the ownership or licensing of such
technology is limited. As noted above, the VISA and MasterCard
networks and various clearing house and ATM networks confer
network benefits on each alliance participant that would be
unachievable without the alliance. 16
14. See, e.g., Michael O'D. Moore, Insurance: Zurich to Cover On-Line Risks in
Deal with IBM, AM. BANKER, FEB. 9, 1999, at 10 (reporting alliance between Zurich
Financial Services Group and IBM to sell E-Risk Protection Program, a risk management
program for financial institutions, with Zurich providing insurance against electronic
commerce risks and BM providing risk-reduction consulting services); Goldman, ADP
start 401(k) Venture, AM. BANKER-BOND BUYER, Feb. 1, 1999, at 1, 2, available in
LEXIS, News Library, ABBB File (reporting offering of defined contribution plan
designed for small businesses to be sold through Goldman Sachs Asset Management's
network of independent financial advisors, where Goldman will provide investment
management and funding for program and Automatic Data Processing, inc. will provide
administrative and record-keeping services).
15. Citigroup has taken this approach to mitigate choice of technology risk in the
electronic bill presentment and fulfillment area through its internal efforts and by entering
into both the Integrion and the TransPoint alliances. See Citibank Storms EBP&P Market
In TransPoint Deal With MSFDC, FUTURE BANKER, Dec. 7, 1998, at 16.
16. See, e.g., Twelve U.S. Banks Band Together to Form SVPCo and to Advance-
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D. Setting Industry Standards
Banks often find that a new financial product or service will
require adoption by a large number of industry players to gain the
widespread customer acceptance necessary for its profitability.
Widespread interest in developing such a product or service will cause
the banks to band together to develop the new technology, support the
product or service, to promulgate standards relating to the product or
service, or create a common system to provide the product or service.
Modern check clearing and mortgage origination are two
examples of the desire for industry uniformity yielding market
efficiencies. Uniform standards for checks have permitted the
application of high-speed check routing, sorting and capture to the
check clearing business, with costs savings shared by all. The
standardization of practices and documentation in the residential
mortgage market effectively reduces the costs of everyone seeking to
originate and sell mortgage loans in the secondary market. More
recently, CertCo and eight global banks have announced the formation
of a joint venture intended to facilitate business-to-business electronic
commerce by creating digital certificates based on a common set of
rules, contracts and business practices. 17
E. Gain Benefit of Partner's Expertise/Strength
Non bank firms such as technology, specialty finance,
insurance and mutual fund firms have developed various products and
expertise which banks would like to provide to their customers.
Usually it would be an expensive and lengthy process to develop and
maintain these products and expertise inside the bank, which drives
banks to align with these outside fimns
In the technology context, these alliances often result in
licensing arrangements. The bank licensing the technology is also able
to avoid undertaking a separate research effort from scratch. In
Finally-the Electronic Transfer of Check Information., FUTURE BANKER, Dec. 7, 1998,
at 100 (formation of for-profit partnership to sell electronic check presentment and ACH
services to other financial institutions).
17. See Global Institutions Unite to Create a Certificate Authority Network, FUTURE
BANKER, Dec. 7, 1998, at 46.
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addition, the licensor company can often effectively leverage its
technological advantage with the bank's resources.
Take the example of the various providers of comprehensive,
turnkey solutions that offer banks everything they need to begin
offering their products and services over the Internet quickly and
affordably. The suite of products offered frequently includes online
banking software for retail customers, online banking software for
small businesses, a customized web site, interactive calculators, secure
account origination, account finder applications, search capabilities,
and administrative tools, all of which would be very difficult to create
on a stand-alone basis. The provider also can provide web site design,
maintenance and hosting, customer service, training and support,
online transaction processing, brand management, and marketing
consulting. In other cases, however, a party may find that only one
source exists for the technology they desire. Patents or the expertise
of particular individuals may dictate that an alliance with a specific
firm is the only viable way to obtain access to the desired technology,
regardless of the time and money a firm is willing to spend
independently.
Of course, a party seeking a technology or product solution
from a third party risks dependence on another company. This
dependence may cause the larger company to fail to undertake its own
efforts in areas that are critical to its future. This failure can have
devastating effects if the small company defaults on its obligations
because of financial problems, lack of experience or capability, or if
the smaller company is acquired by one of the larger company's
competitors.
Creating new distribution channels and selling to customers
with whom one has no prior relationship is extremely difficult, time
consuming and expensive. An alliance can provide instant access to
established and efficient distribution channels, as well as receptive
customer bases.
In the insurance and investment product area, the bank's
motivations for the alliance may be slightly different. In these
alliances, the bank is often seeking to obtain a partner's operating,
marketing or regulatory expertise, or access to a partner's distribution
system or customer base. This is especially the case where certain
products offered by the partner either cannot be provided by the bank
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or the bank lacks the marketing expertise or regulatory authority to
offer the product on its own. In addition, the sale of mutual funds or
insurance products carry certain regulatory risks which can make
mistakes in administering the sale of these products extremely costly.
As the mutual fund and insurance firms are knowledgeable about these
regulatory constraints, a partnering arrangement in these areas can
eliminate the risks associated with violation the guidelines by
transferring them to the partner. Banks should be aware, however,
that many potential partners for such alliances would want access to
the bank's customer information, which could be a negative driver for
the bank.
By its nature, an alliance involves the sharing of access to
crucial competitive tools for meeting customer needs. Unless care is
taken, access to such tools can result in access to the relationship of an
alliance participant with its customers. It is a commonplace today that
participants in the VISA alliance compete with each other for the same
customers, because of which many people have multiple cards. As
data mining sophistication among financial services firms increases,
firms considering participation in alliances will have to carefully
consider what impact the alliance will have on their relationship with
their customers and to factor such effect into their plans, whether or
not they enter alliances.
F. Funding
Companies need capital. In the banking context, this driver
often flows from a non-bank firm that needs investors. Banks
generally are the providers rather than the seekers of capital, and will
be driven into an alliance with a capital-seeking fin due to the
presence of one of the other factors described in this Part. When
entering an alliance, where the bank is providing capital, the bank will
need to keep its own goals in mind when structuring the alliance and
the means of funding the alliance. Disagreements regarding the
method of funding can adversely affect the probability of forming the
alliance. Each party may have different views regarding the
appropriateness and desirability of equity, debt, or research and
development funding. For example, the funded company may insist
on contract research and development funding because it needs to
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show revenues on its income statement. The bank or funding party,
however, may believe that only a small portion of the funding should
be made on a contract research basis and that the remainder should be
equity or debt. The funded party may however have concerns about
independence and may resist an equity investment. The funding party
may request both the protections of debt and the potential upside of
equity and may attempt to achieve this by suggesting a convertible
debt investment. The funded company may object to the funding party
wanting it both ways, or it may be unwilling to bear the burden of debt
(since debt can affect its ability to obtain other loans and ultimately
may have to be repaid) or the dilution to its shareholders of an equity
investment (especially if the company believes its stock is likely to
substantially increase in value over the short term due to an initial
public offering or acquisition). The method of funding also may be
important for other accounting and tax purposes, such as whether
research and development tax credits and deductions are available and
to whom they will flow.
G. Competitive Advantage
Participation in an alliance may enable a bank to obtain a
strategic advantage over its competitors either by obtaining a "first
user" advantage regarding a new product or service or by pre-empting
competitors from obtaining such advantage. With the rapid pace of
innovation and technological development, many firms will want to
stay ahead of the rest of the industry in both the development and
implementation of new products and technology. Today, bank
customers demand an increased level of convenience and efficiency
from their financial institution. Banks must therefore have access to
two things (i) cutting-edge technology and (ii) a wide array of financial
products.
Banks maintain an enviable position of trust with their
customers, and still have perhaps the greatest array of contacts with
customers of any financial services provider. The bank can strengthen
existing customer relationships by placing the bank at the center of
delivery of a wide array of financial and related products and services
to the customer. The more products and services a bank can deliver,
the more difficult it is for competitors to encroach on customer
[Vol. 3
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relationships. Strategic alliances give banks the power and the ability
to pioneer and innovate and thereby enter new sectors of the financial
services industry while expanding and strengthening its customer base.
Adept exploitation of new technologies through alliances with firms
that are pioneering technologies, such as interactive kiosks, computer
banking, and Internet banking, can enhance a bank's advantage in
retaining and attracting customers. In addition, a bank may limit its
competitors' access to a particular technology by prohibiting a
strategic partner that has developed a unique technology from entering
competing alliances.
By leading industry development into new markets, such as
investment products and electronic banking, financial institutions can
make it more difficult for customers to forego their product. Banks
then become more than simply a convenient parking place for idle
funds. Customers incur increasing "switching" costs as their use of
new and sophisticated banking services expands. For example, a
customer with a simple checking or savings account has little cost
associated with abandoning one institution in favor of another. On the
other hand, a customer that obtains a large number of products and
services from the bank, and participates in a bank's loyalty programs,
must devote substantial time and effort to change financial institutions
and may sacrifice the benefits associated with being a long-time
customer of the bank. Therefore, the more sophisticated products and
services a financial institution offers, the more and better customers
the institution is likely to attract and keep.
H. Brand Extension
A Bank will often want to increase the value of its brand by
diversifying the number of products that it offers to its customers that
carry the bank's brand. By heightening brand awareness, the bank
will be seen as a larger market player. A Bank is in an ideal position
to increase brand awareness as its customers have trust in the bank and
its products and are willing to experiment with the bank's new brands.
The desire to increase brand awareness will likely compel the bank to
partner with firms that specialize in these products. Usually, the
bank's partner will want to use the bank brand to market its products
as it has not developed its own brand and therefore will have concerns
1999]
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that a product offered in its name will not be accepted by customers.
This melding of interests has led to the numerous private-labeling
programs offered through banks.
L Validation
Many small technology or other types of companies may seek
a strategic alliance as a means to validate themselves or their products
in the marketplace. Often the non-bank company will look to a large
bank or a well-respected smaller bank. The smaller non-bank
company will anticipate that in offering its own products and services
in conjunction with the identity of its larger, well-established alliance
partner, the smaller company will ultimately obtain credibility with
third parties. The smaller company will seek to exploit the fact that
others should feel comfortable licensing their technology or using their
services because XYZ Bank does so. The funded company will hope
that these validation benefits (whether derived from a licensing
relationship or an equity investment by the larger organization) will
create a marketing "snowball." The measurable effects of the
"snowball validation" are often less than the small company imagines.
Depending on themarket, a firm's choice of alliance partners
may have a dramatic effect on the firm's market image and strategy.
Allying with a credible firm, such as a bank with a reputation as a
trusted party, may be useful to capitalize on the bank's credibility or
market image. Creating the alliance itself can build positive market
awareness as a key player simply through publicity of the alliance. In
addition, joining forces with a competitor in order to build or sustain
market share may be a sound strategy. An alliance with other
marketplace leaders can also help shape or design the market to one's
own benefit.
Of course, association with a large bank partner may have a
negative effect as well. Even where the smaller company is legally
permitted to do business with competitors of the bank, the relationship
itself may make the smaller company and its services unattractive to
the bank's competitors for fear of the large bank partner having access




As the lines between industries continue to blur because of
regulatory and technological changes, an alliance with a key player
may allow financial institutions, and technology firms, to offer new
products and services. The ability to offer new products and services
early may mean the difference between leading or competing in these
new areas and being forced to take what is left over once those that
lead the industry establish themselves. In addition, the ability to offer
a variety of products and services can reduce overall enterprise risk by
diversifying the bank's sources of income. Eventually, diversification
will lead to stronger earnings, which will improve the bank's
performance ratios, and hopefully elicit a positive response from the
market.
III. DIFFERENT FORMS OF ALLIANCES
Strategic alliances may fall anywhere in the gray area between
traditional contractual arrangements and complete corporate
acquisitions. Some alliances are no more than brief corporate affairs,
lasting only as long as it takes one partner to establish entry into a new
market. Others are the prelude to a full marriage of two or more
companies' technologies and capabilities, at least in a product line, if
not the entire organization. In fact, some have suggested the alliance
between two firms is merely an incomplete form of merger. 18
In the minds of most, the classic strategic alliance takes the
form of a joint venture, where a separate entity is formed, jointly
owned and controlled by the parties, to operate as an "independent"
company. However, the term alliance in a broad sense encompasses a
great variety of arrangements designed to address all parties' strategic
needs, and accommodating their strategic constraints. Such structures
may look like a classic joint venture, but with more severe constraints
on the venture's operations, or take the form of a "servicing"
arrangement or a consortium, designed to promulgate technology or
operating standards, or a license agreement, relating to specified
technology, or a joint development or marketing agreement, and may
18. See George J. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L.
REv. 176, 177 (1955).
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or may not include equity investments or other equity up-side
participation.
A leading authority on the subject defines a "strategic
alliance" as, "any formal arrangement between two or more entities
for purposes of ongoing cooperation and mutual gain." 19 According to
this authority, forms of strategic alliance include (but are not limited
to): (i) joint ventures; (ii) licensing agreements; (iii) minority equity
investments; (iv) value-chain partnerships; (v) co-marketing/co-
development agreements; and (vi) consortia."0 This authority further
dramatizes alliances as either pooling alliances, where participants
combine similar resources, or trading arrangements, where
participants exchange dissimilar resources.2 In all of these cases,
there is at minimum a partnering agreement that is an exchange
completed, often well-defined, over time.22
A. Marketing Arrangements
Marketing arrangements have always been popular in banking.
Third parties always seek to market their products through banks due
to the banks' "trusted party" image and function, as well as banks'
powerful distribution networks. Banks have long sought the fee
income and lower unit costs associated with offering other products
through their distribution systems, such as travelers checks, insurance
products and non-proprietary mutual funds.
Marketing arrangements have been effected in many ways.
Historically, the most common methods of effecting marketing
arrangements to bank customers have been through (i) direct
marketing through the bank to customers (e.g., statement stuffers,
ATM notices, branch advertising); (ii) the sale of customer lists; and
(iii) referral arrangements, which have ranged from straight finder fee
arrangements to percentage leases, where a bank rents lobby space to
a third party who will market its products to the bank's customers.
Common methods of marketing bank products and services through
19. Edward J. Zajac, The Promises and Pitfalls of Strategic Alliances, Presentation to
the UNICON Conference at Northwestern University (Apr. 6, 1998).
20. See id.
21. See Stigler, supra note 18, at 176.
22. See VILLENUEVE ET AL., supra note 4, at 1-2.
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third parties include endorsement and co-branding arrangements (e.g.,
credit card co-branding) and various exclusive and preferred provider
arrangements, such as preferred placement on Internet web sites and
the recently announced extension and expansion of the exclusive
marketing alliance between First USA Bank and America Online.23
The primary tension in a marketing relationship relates to control over
the customer relationship.
B. Licensing Arrangements
Licensing agreements are generally limited in scope and can
range in importance to the parties from mundane (such as "shrink-
wrap" licenses for commercially available software) to mission-critical
(in a word, strategic). The latter arrangement will be discussed
below.
In a license arrangement, one company will obtain existing
intellectual property rights (either some proprietary technology or
technical know-how trade secrets or a trademark relating to a
proprietary product) from another company sufficient for the licensed
party to reproduce the technology or offer the proprietary product with
its own resources. The parties will enter an agreement setting forth
the terms of their relationship, including the terms of the intellectual
property license. Payment in these licensing arrangements typically
will be in the form of up-front or on-going royalties.
Joint development agreements are a special breed of license
arrangements where the objective is to design and develop a defined
end-product (often a technology) within a specified time frame and
cost, generally involving joint rights in the developed technology or
product. Although the contract may call for R&D funding, payment is
more typically made in the form of up-front and on-going royalties.
The primary tension in a joint development relationship relates
to the parties' respective rights to use the technology or product for
other purposes, particularly where the technology or product has been
developed or highly customized for the financial partner. Depending
on how much of the development costs are defrayed by the payments
23. See First USA in Marketing Agreement with AOL, AM. BANKER, Feb. 4, 1999, at
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from the financial partner, the financial partner may insist either on
strict limitations on the developer's ability to make the technology or
product available to the financial partner's competitors or that the
financial partner be entitled to receive a participation interest in the
future royalty stream or an equity participation interest in the
developer.
Parties resort to this structure when a more encompassing
relationship is not reasonable or desirable, but where the technology or
product partner has some proprietary technology rights or unique
know how that cannot (or cannot easily) be replicated and the financial
services company needs to avoid a time-consuming (if not futile)
research and development effort. As with servicing and marketing
arrangements, the cornerstone of these relationships is reliance on the
unique skills of the partner to obtain a benefit that the financial partner
realistically cannot obtain on its own. The benefits to the licensor
(apart from the royalty stream itself) may include greater assurance of
market acceptance of the technology or product (the "validation"
effect).
C. Service Arrangements
A servicing arrangement is what it sounds like; simply put, a
party enters into an arrangement with a third party service provider to
provide a service. Where the service is crucial and the servicing
arrangement involves the third party assuming complete control over
the operation of one or more of the bank's business functions,
including providing its own employees, equipment and technology, for
the bank (a classic "outsourcing" deal), the service arrangement may
properly be called strategic.
Traditionally, these arrangements have related to "back-
office" functions, such as data and item processing, customer support
and call center operations, where either the only customer for the
service is the bank itself or the service is provided on a private-label
basis and the bank's customers are unaware that the bank is not itself
providing the service.
Servicing can be defined to include any arrangement where a
company delegates a core business function (or operations crucial to a
core business function) to a third party. As such, servicing can be
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thought of as a logical extension of a licensing arrangement. In a
licensing arrangement, the licensee seeks to obtain from another
company some crucial technology or intellectual property right
sufficient for the licensee to utilize the technology or offer the product
with its own resources. In a servicing deal, on the other hand, the
party seeking to acquire servicing recognizes that merely licensing the
particular "expertise" of the other party will not achieve its strategic
goals. For example, the other party may possess no special
technological advantage, but may merely operate at such a volume that
it enjoys better economies of scale than the bank. Accordingly, one
can view many "line-of-business" sale transactions, such as sales of
merchant processing and credit card portfolios and corporate trust and
transfer agent operations, as forms of servicing arrangements, albeit
where a substantial portion of the future value in the relationship is
being prepaid to the "seller" as purchase price.
Service contract arrangements are commonly found in the
offering of electronic and computer banking services. Many banks
have been providing electronic bill payment and fulfillment services
through service contracts with entities like CheckFree Corp., and
more recently, TransPoint (the Microsoft Corp., First Data Corp.,
Citigroup joint venture) and Integrion Financial Network, which have
been focusing on the development of standard platforms and delivery
systems for these services.
D. Equity Participation
Equity participations are non-controlling equity investments.
Equity investments in an alliance partner can be a useful device to help
close a valuation gap or to provide some measure of equity
participation short of full control.
Equity participations usually take the legal form of a stock
acquisition, governed by a stock purchase agreement. In a limited
number of circumstances, however, equity participations have been
created by using participation agreements.
Parties often use the equity participation structure where an
existing company is in need of capital to finance growth or research
and development and other parties interested in providing capital to the
company believe that there is potential upside in an equity investment
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and want to share in that potential. Often these arrangements will
result in the equity participants enjoying certain pricing or other
preferences from the developer company. The equity participants also
have the advantage of participating in the business and reaping the
rewards of the end product, as well as learning about the product
before it is released to the marketplace.
There are significant risks related to an equity participation
arrangement. The participants can experience a complete loss of their
investment. In addition, banks are very protective of their image and
a failure of the company in which they have invested could negatively
impact the participants' reputations, as they will have been perceived
as endorsing both the product and the company they have invested in.
In addition, there are certain tensions inherent in the equity
participation alliance. The minority investors will generally have no
control over changes in business direction, or worse may be subject to
another minority participant's veto on a change in the developer
company's direction. In addition, depending on the size of the
investment, there may be a lengthy regulatory process to be contended
with before any investment can be made.
The equity participation form of investment is appropriate to
be used as a means of leveraging a limited investment through several
partners where control is not crucial. An example of banks engaging
in an equity participation in another banking enterprise is Security
First Network Bank. Security First was itself a financial institution, a
virtual thrift that existed only on the Internet. A group of banks made
an equity investment in Security First and thereby got an inside view
into the operation of Internet banking. Interestingly enough, in the
summer of 1997 when Security First was having difficulty due to
lagging investor confidence, six of its competitor financial institutions,
including Citicorp, Huntington Bancshares and Barnett Banks, Inc.,
made a $14 million investment in Security First. 24
Mondex is an example of banks investing in a technology
company as a means of getting access to a cutting-edge financial
product. In 1996, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Michigan National Bank,
The First National Bank of Chicago, Texas Commerce Bank, and
24. See Steven Marjanovic, 6 Big Names Aid Net Pioneer With $14M Injection, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 8, 1997, at 1.
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AT&T Universal Card Services, Corp. all invested in equity
participations as minority owners in two LLCs to operate the stored
value system originated by Mondex U.S.A. Each bank participant
made their investment in Mondex through newly-formed operating
subsidiaries of the banks. The banks' investment in Mondex gave
them an early opportunity in the stored value card business.2 5
The bank investments in Security First Network Bank and
Mondex are examples of pure equity investments, without other
formal entanglements between the parties. These are rare. More
often equity investments are entered into incident to marketing,
servicing or research and development licensing arrangements.
The First Union Corporation investment in Nova Corporation
is an example of an equity investment coupled with a servicing
arrangement. In 1995, First Union sold its merchant processing
portfolio to Nova in exchange for approximately 32% of the stock of
Nova. The alliance has been mutually beneficial as it has given Nova
enhanced credibility in the marketplace and First Union has been able
to enjoy the equity upside of Nova's success.2 6
An example of an equity participation arrangement coupled
with a joint development arrangement is Phoenix International Ltd.'s
relationship with its investor banks. In 1993, 11 community banks
invested in client/server core processing software that was being
developed by Phoenix, a Maitland, Florida company. The Phoenix
International arrangement was designed to be an active strategic
alliance between the company and the investor banks. The company
encouraged the banks to invest by discounting the price of the software
license to the investors. The company wanted the banks to be
involved with the design of the software to ensure that it would meet
the needs of the company's targeted customer base. The Phoenix
International equity investments allowed the banks to enjoy the
potential upside of an equity investment in Phoenix while providing
Phoenix with needed research and development capital and receiving a
25. See Jeffrey Kutler, Wells, Chase Take Lead Stakes As Seven Invest in Mondex
USA, AM. BANKER, Dec. 5, 1996, at 1.
26. See Robert Jennings, I' Union, 1 Fidelity in Deal With Processor, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 2, 1995, at 19 (reporting the alliance); Jeremy Quittner, Merchant Processing
Turmoil Seen in CoreStates Deal, AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 1997, at 13 (discussing the 32%
stake acquired).
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discounted license for use of Phoenix's products. It appears that the
collaboration has been a success. As of the end of 1996, Phoenix
International had 121 bank customers.27
Banks will also engage in equity participations as a means of
protecting their customer relationships from developers of new
financial products. MECA Software, L.L.C. is owned jointly by
subsidiaries of BankAmerica Corporation, Citigroup, Fleet Financial
Group, Royal Bank of Canada, U.S. Bancorp, and the insurance
company New England Financial. 8 MECA performs data processing
services related to its personal finance program, "Managing Your
Money." One of the strategic decisions prompting the banks'
acquisition of MECA was the need for the banks to take control of the
customer relationship and an unwillingness to cede that relationship to
Microsoft (Money) and Intuit (Quicken).
29
E. Joint Ventures
In a classic joint venture, two or more firms form a separate
entity subject to their joint control to engage in some discrete business,
either dealing with customers directly or providing products and
services on a branded or private labeled basis through the parties.
Parties resort to joint ventures in order to share specific opportunities
and risks, generally independently of (although often related to) the
other on-going activities of the partners, while providing a vehicle to
measure their relative contributions and the benefits to be derived and
to contain possible liabilities associated with the venture's activities.
In many cases, the partners will narrowly define the
permissible scope of the venture's activities, either limiting the venture
to a product or technology development role or limiting the scope of
27. See Drew Clark, Banks Putting Their Money Where Their Mouse Is, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 29, 1998, at 1.
28. See OCC Interpretive Letter 677 [1994-1995 Transfer Binder], Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCII) 83,625 (June 28, 1995); Royal Bank of Canada, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 363,
364 (Apr. 1996).
29. As of January 1999, MECA reported that more than a million customers use
Managing Your Money through its financial institutions and claimed a 30% share of
personal financial management home banking customers. See Jeffrey Kutler, On-Line
Banking: Software Pioneer Meca Seeks Buyer to Move Beyond Financial Services, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 28, 1999, at 1. MECA also reported that it was seeking a buyer,
attempting to expand beyond the financial sector. See id.
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products that it may offer to prevent cannibalization of existing
customer relationships. According to many of the management
consultants who review joint ventures, too narrow a scope for the joint
venture may imperil the joint venture, either by foregoing the benefits
of scale operations (for example, if the venture is limited to product
development) or precluding access to markets closely related to the
markets permissible to the venture.
The legal form of the joint venture entity may be a
corporation, general or limited partnership, or limited liability
company. The choice of entity will be determined primarily by
liability limitation and tax considerations, although there are some
fiduciary duty concerns that militate in favor of a limited partnership
or limited liability company structure.
There are many examples of classic joint venture arrangements
involving banks. The vast majority of these arrangements have
centered on the development of new technology concepts to assists in
the delivery of services related to the modernization of the payments
system. Integrion, TransPoint, and the never-realized ECTC30 are
examples of joint ventures with this focus.
In 1996 Integrion Financial Network, L.L.C., a joint venture
between twelve national banks, with IBM and other financial
institutions, was formed to provide home banking and other financial
services to the customers of the participating banks. 31 Each participant
made a minority investment in Integrion through an operating
subsidiary. Integrion was established to design, develop, license, and
market services enabling participating financial institutions to offer
their customers various services, such as traditional home banking and
financial services. Integrion intends to provide its bank customers an
30. Electronic Commerce Trust Co. (ECTC) was to be the result of a recent
collaboration led by Huntington Bancshares to be engaged in the electronic bill
presentment and payment business. The ECTC collaborators commissioned an extensive
feasibility study and ECTC was to be a major competitor to TransPoint and CheckFree.
To the authors' knowledge the ECTC venture has never materialized.
31. Conditional Approval Letter No. 221 (Dec. 4, 1996), available in 1996 OCC Ltr.
LEXIS 139. Integrion was established as a limited liability company owned and operated
by IBM, ABN AMRO North America, Bank One, Bank of America, Barnett Bank,
Comerica, First Bank Systems, First Chicago NBD, Fleet Financial Group, Key Corp,
Mellon Bank, Michigan National Bank, NationsBank, Norwest, PNC Bank, Royal Bank
of Canada, and Washington Mutual, Inc. In 1997, First Union National Bank and
Citibank joined Integrion. Visa U.S.A. also joined following Integrion's acquisition of
the operations of Visa's Visa Interactive home banking and bill payment subsidiary.
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alternative to existing online banking systems and products by
providing a common platform for both business and consumer banking
customers.
In 1998, Citigroup joined an existing joint venture called
MSFDC between Microsoft Corp. and First Data Corp. As a result of
Citigroup's investment in MSFDC, the venture changed its name to
TransPoint. TransPoint is a provider of electronic bill presentment
and fulfillment services and competes with Integrion in this area. The
TransPoint investment gave Citigroup, which is also a member of
Integrion, an opportunity to hedge its bets as to which player would
emerge as the predominant electronic bill presentment and fulfillment
provider.
Banks may also form or become involved in joint ventures as
an alternative to, or in connection with a servicing arrangement. As
discussed above, banks often decide to outsource certain core
businesses, as they do not have the inclination or the resources to
engage in these businesses in any type of scale. Certain banks,
however, still want to enjoy the potential upside of the successes of
these lines of business. Banks may therefore participate in joint
ventures, which perform these services to a broad base of customers,
as a way to derive profits from these businesses without directly
engaging in them. For example, First Data Corp. has offered a joint
venture structure as an alternative when it purchases merchant
processing portfolios from larger banks.
IV. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
In our view, the principal obligation of counsel to strategic
alliance participants is to structure and document the alliance in a
manner that permits the parties to achieve, to the extent practicable,
their respective strategic goals and to accommodate (or avoid) the
various constraints on achievement of such goals through the alliance.
To that end, counsel should carefully consider whether and to what
extent the "tools" described in this section are appropriate for or can
be adapted for use in the proposed venture. We use the term "tools"
(as opposed to "legal issues" or some similar phrase) only to make the
point that counsel may select any number of devices or techniques in
designing and documenting the alliance and that the choices
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appropriate for one structure and one set of strategic goals and
constraints may well be inappropriate for another.
A. Control and Governance
Control is both a business and legal consideration. In
acquisitions, the presumption is that the acquiror will make all
business decisions after consummation (although the seller's
shareholders may be "represented" on the Board of the acquiror). In
a strategic alliance, however, the very nature of the relationship
requires that the parties cooperate over an extended period.
From a business perspective, control may be best split evenly
between the participants in a strategic alliance. Many alliance
participants are so concerned about controlling the alliance that they
fail to nurture it, with the result that participants fail to develop the
alliance's "collaborative advantage" and thereby neglect a key
resource. 32 A study conducted by McKinsey & Co. suggested that 50-
50 strategic alliances are more likely to succeed than ventures in which
ownership and management are not evenly split between participants. 33
The study found that the 50-50 alliance was a success for the
participants 60% of the time, contrasted with only 30% success where
ownership was not evenly split. The study reasoned that when the
participants have equal interest in the alliance, there is a commitment
to mutual success and a recognition that both participants must work
hard to achieve the alliance's goals. When one participant has a
majority stake, it tends to dominate decision making and put its
interests above those of its partner, or for that matter, the alliance
itself, with the result that both partners tend to be worse off.34 This
suggests that control should be allocated in such a manner as to avoid
deadlock problems.
Regardless of the form of the proposed alliance, one party (or
possibly both parties) will likely conclude that the achievement of one
or more of its strategic goals will require that it be able to exercise
32. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances, HARV.
Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1994, at 96.
33. See McKinsey & Co., Seminar Presentation on Achieving Growth with Alliances
in McLean, Va (Nov. 19 1997).
34. See Bleeke & Ernst, supra note 5, at 129.
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some degree of control over some important aspect of the alliance or
may conclude that one of its strategic constraints is that it must retain
control over some aspect of the alliance's activities (such as access to
its customers). In many contexts there are two conceptual varieties of
control: positive control (the power to direct) and negative control (the
power to reject or veto changes or, ultimately, to terminate the
relationship). Control is a slippery concept, however, and frequently
overrated as a useful tool, so it may be helpful to explore some of the
various flavors of control, the circumstances in which they arise and
possible techniques counsel may use to allocate control between the
parties so as to vindicate, to the extent possible, each party's
expectations.
1. Scope of Alliance and Obligations of Parties
Counsel should seek to reflect in the definitive alliance
agreement the parties' agreement as to the intended scope of the
alliance and the parties' respective rights and obligations. A clear
definition (and understanding) of scope, rights and obligations may
reduce the chance that the parties will later have a major
misunderstanding that sours the relationship.
Of course, no one is prescient and it is neither necessary nor
possible (or some would say, desirable) to cover every conceivable
circumstance contractually. Counsel, however, should use the drafting
process to encourage the participants to explore a wide range of
possible outcomes to ensure that the structure they create is flexible
enough to accommodate those outcomes. Alliances may have
problems meeting their initial goals, either due to unrealistic
projections at the outset or because trends, such as shifting markets,
new technologies, or changing customer needs, can rarely be
predicted. s
Even where the parties have entered into an alliance with a
shared view as to the intended scope of the alliance's activities and
their respective rights and obligations, they may differ substantially in
their willingness to permit that scope or those rights and obligations to
change materially in response to changing conditions. That should be
35. See id. at 128.
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unsurprising. One would expect the strategic goals and constraints
applicable to each party to change as circumstances change, and those
changed goals and constraints might well lead the parties to desire
more substantial changes to the alliance (including possibly
termination of the alliance) than the change proposed by the other
party. As with most control issues, these are issues of positive control
and negative control.
In most contractual arrangements, be they licensing
arrangements or marketing alliances, veto power over the scope of the
alliance is allocated to each party by default. The parties will describe
the permitted uses of the licensed technology or product, will define in
reasonable detail the obligations of the parties to support each other's
efforts, and will set forth certain limitations on the parties' activities
relating to the alliance, including limitations on the use of confidential
and proprietary information. Although the agreement may leave
certain matters to be agreed upon by the parties over time (for
example, the precise terms of marketing efforts), the agreement
generally will be quite precise as to the scope and duties of the parties
and any waivers or amendments will usually require the written
approval of each affected party, effectively giving veto power over
cfianges to each party.
Unfortunately, too rigid a structure may doom the alliance.
The marketplace changes quickly and the parties should place a
premium on flexibility, rather than on veto power per se. In practice,
rational parties will cooperate with each other and will agree to
proposed changes to the relationship so long as their respective goals
are still being met with the revised relationship.
Although the basic balance of shared veto power often works
in practice, counsel should consider advising their clients to build
some flexibility into the terms of the agreement. For example, in a
joint development agreement, the parties may need to adjust the
requirements for the technology or product being developed to account
for changes in the needs of the marketplace or for unanticipated
setbacks in the development process.
The parties should also pay special attention to those aspects of
the relationship that they are most concerned about and only retain
veto power over those matters. For example, most banks regard their
customer base and the various bank-based marketing channels
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available to reach those customers (proprietary mailing lists, statement
stuffers, ATM notices, lobby advertising) as their most valuable
intangible assets and, with good reason, are loathe to permit direct
access to those customers or marketing channels without strict
limitations and oversight by the bank and mechanisms to avoid diluting
the bank's relationship with its customer. Hence, the frequent use of
private label programs to offer products and services under the bank's
name (for example, in such contexts as agent bank offerings of credit
cards and offers of many investment products) and more recently
through co-branding arrangements.36 While the bank may be more
concerned about the manner in which customers will be solicited, the
third party may desire the flexibility to meet market demand by
modifying the precise terms and conditions of the product or service
being offered. To the extent counsel can elicit sufficient information
from the parties to recognize those differing concerns, counsel can
draft the agreement to provide the bank veto control over the
marketing (and cross-marketing) arrangements, while giving the
alliance partner the positive power to adjust the terms of the product
without threat of veto by the bank.
All too frequently, however, it is not clear to whom the
customer "belongs." For example, in the many arrangements banks
have entered into with Intuit to offer home banking services through
Intuit's Quicken personal finance software, is a bank customer who is
using the Intuit product the customer of the bank or the customer of
Intuit? Is it realistic to expect Intuit to refrain from providing links
from the Intuit web site to various providers of competitive credit and
investment services? Where a third party who generally offers certain
products and services to the public agrees to provide discounted
products and services to customers of the bank (and perhaps a
commission to the bank) in return for the bank offering those products
and services to its customers, how do the parties accurately identify
who is a bank customer responding to the marketing efforts and who,
therefore, ought to be "off-limits" for "predatory" cross-marketing by
the third party? The parties may set forth certain presumptions (e.g.,
customers arriving via a link on the bank's web site or calling a
36. See, e.g., Michael O'D. Moore, Nationwide Teaming up with Key Corp on
Annuity, AM. BANKER, Feb. 8, 1999, at 13 (describing proposed offering of Nationwide
Financial Services co-branded variable annuity through KeyCorp).
[Vol. 3
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
dedicated toll-free number assigned to the bank belong to the bank) or
solicit feedback from the customer ("How did you learn about our
services?") to determine to which party the customer belongs, but
those are imperfect devices at best.
In the major outsourcing arrangements, control concerns raise
different issues. More so even than in other contractual relationships,
the parties will define in excruciating detail the respective obligations
of the parties, standards for performance, and the like, but there will
always remain a desire to preserve the flexibility to adjust the
relationship for changed circumstances. For example, an acquisitive
bank may be concerned about getting priority in accommodating its
desires for the timing of conversion of acquired companies' systems.
A possible seller may desire the flexibility to sell the institution
without paying an extortionate termination fee. An outsourcing
arrangement also creates a long term dependence on a single vendor.
The bank will have lost, in most instances, equipment, personnel and
day-to-day control over a vital component of its business. Since the
fate of the vendor may become the fate of the bank, the bank may
desire the ability to revisit the arrangement after a period of time or to
terminate the relationship even in the absence of breach.
Similarly, in combined sale and marketing arrangements,
retention of the power to adjust the relationship may be of vital
importance to the seller. Where banks have sold their credit card or
merchant processing portfolios to larger players, the acquiror will
typically insist on a long-term (often five to seven year) exclusive
marketing relationship and the right to purchase any subsequently
acquired portfolios. When the selling bank acquires a bank that is also
subject to such a marketing obligation, it must either be able to
terminate the acquired bank's arrangement or, if unable to do so, must
be able to carve that bank's franchise out of its own obligations.
If the scope of the strategic alliance is too narrow, or the terms
too restrictive, the alliance participant may lock itself into a
relationship as a result of which it is unable to adjust its business to
react to competitive or technological changes. Similarly, smaller
alliance participants (particularly a smaller technology or niche
product company) may be concerned that the terms of the alliance put
such constraints on its options that the alliance becomes, in effect, an
inadvertent (at least from the smaller company's perspective)
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acquisition of the smaller company by the larger participant. This
latter concern can occur where licenses are broad (covering
technology, especially core technology, and not just products) and
exclusive, or where restrictive rights of first offer or first refusal on
new products make it extremely difficult for the smaller company to
do deals with any third party. An over-broad or exclusive license may
also make acquisition of the smaller participant unattractive to third
parties.
2. Control Over Other Party
Most alliances are entered into only after careful consideration
of the proposed alliance partners and the expertise, proprietary
knowledge and technology and financial resources that they bring to
the table. Accordingly, it is not unusual to find that most alliance
agreements provide that the parties' respective rights and obligations
are not assignable (sometimes even to affiliates) without the prior
consent of the other party and that if one party experiences a change in
control, the other party may terminate the alliance. 37 Further, many
alliance agreements will treat an assignment by operation of law (other
than perhaps to an affiliate) as a change in control, perhaps entitling
both the assigning party and the other party the right to terminate the
alliance.
These concerns also commonly express themselves in the form
of non-competition and non-solicitation covenants, where one party
obtains covenants from the other party that it will refrain from
entering into certain competitive lines of business during the life of the
venture or refrain from soliciting customers. In the case of ventures,
the covenants might run to the business and customers of the venture.
In other cases, the covenants might run to business and customers of
the venture partners. To the extent the non-competition covenants
extend to affiliates (and they usually do), the covenanting party will
desire that exceptions be drawn for pre-existing relationships and
investments, fiduciary and custodial investments on behalf of trusts,
37. See, e.g., Cheryl Winokur, Do Marketer Buyouts Hurt Customers? Some Small
Banks Fear Client Poaching If Rival Buys 3d-Party Firm, AM. BANKER, Feb, 1, 1999, at
6 (describing concerns expressed by small banks about large bank and insurer acquisitions
of third party marketing firms that small banks use to distribute investment products).
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employee benefit plans, advised mutual funds and the like, de minimus
(typically less than 5%) equity investments in public companies, and
immaterial acquisitions of businesses engaged in competitive
businesses (with either the power to retain the immaterial competitive
business or to enjoy some reasonable period to dispose of it in an
orderly manner).
3. Control Issues Specific to Ventures
Alliances that take the form of a jointly owned enterprise raise
substantially similar control concerns, but the range of circumstances
is potentially broader and the opportunities to design creative
governance structures are more numerous. Ventures are typically
created as a separate entity, jointly owned and controlled. In these
cases, there are likely to be three levels of authority: (i) the highest
authority, being at the shareholder or partner level; (ii) the day-to-day
operational authority, being at the board of directors or partnership
level; and (iii) the executive authority, being at the officer or general
manager level. A well-crafted alliance agreement will deal with the
kinds of matters that must be approved by the shareholder or partners,
the kinds of matters that must be approved by the board of directors or
the partners committee, and the kinds of matters that are delegated to
the officers of the venture.
Perhaps second only to management concerns, parties seek to
exert some measure of control over their financial commitment.
Where a separate venture is created (and often in other structures as
well), the parties are often expected to make a financial commitment
to the enterprise, either in the form of equity contributions to an entity
(either a venture or as a minority equity investment) or to expend
funds or otherwise devote significant resources to the alliance.
Although the parties may readily agree on the initial financial
obligations of the parties, more difficult questions arise when the
alliance needs more working capital, either to make additional capital
expenditures or to fund operating losses. The decisions regarding
these additional obligations and their allocation among the participants
must be discussed thoroughly in advance, and mechanisms for
allocation should be specified in the alliance agreement. In addition, a
decision should be made as to the relative liabilities of each participant
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in the event a venture borrows funds.
One of the more difficult aspects of an alliance entails deriving
a procedure for approving annual operating and capital budgets.
Generally, all of the participants will want to participate in such a
decision, particularly if the decision means contributing additional
funds to the alliance. On the other hand, the alliance could be stymied
by the failure of one participant to agree to a budget in order to avoid
making additional capital contributions.
A solution may be to have five-year budgets at all times. In
that case, should the participants be unable to agree on a budget in the
second year of a five-year budget, the second year budget of the
original five-year budget would be deemed approved for the new year.
Though the second year of a five year budget will inevitably be in
error, this flawed solution may be preferable to operating with no
budget. Alternatively, the parties may agree that, in the absence of
agreement, the alliance will operate under the prior year's budget,
perhaps adjusted for inflation or business volume.
Alternatively, the alliance may agree to institute a majority
rule for budgets, with the majority being obligated to advance the
funds either as a loan or as a dilution of the equity of the non-
advancing partners. Of course, various default and termination
provisions (discussed below) could come into play in the case of the
participants being unable to agree on a relevant budget.
In the event that a participant fails to contribute the additional
funds required of in the original agreement, a remedy must be
carefully crafted. The first and most critical remedy should be to
divest the defaulting participant of its control or vote with respect to
the alliance. The second remedy should deal with the monetary
obligation. This remedy would include the right to dilute the
ownership of the defaulting participant, the right of the non-defaulting
participants to make loans to the alliance at penalty interest rates, the
right to sue the defaulting participant for its failed contribution and the
right to buy its interest at some specified formula price.
In the event that it is difficult to determine which participant is
in default because no participant actually contributed the required
funds to the alliance (because the non-defaulting participant may not
want to contribute its funds to the alliance if the defaulting participant
refuses to contribute, and the alliance is close to insolvent) an escrow
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arrangement may be appropriate. An escrow arrangement may be
used to verify the defaulting versus the non-defaulting participant and
to protect the funds of the non-defaulting participant from going into
an alliance that is in financial trouble. This remedy, however, is only
useful if the alliance and the non-defaulting participant have a good
remedy against the defaulting participant, such as damages, liquidated,
or otherwise.
Although not unique to venture investment, the venture
agreement typically will contain restrictions on the ability of any
participant to dispose of its equity investment without the consent of
the other parties. This may be reflected in an absolute prohibition
against transfers or in some form of first refusal or buy/sell option.
4. Control Issues Specific to Minority Investments
Alliances that include as an element a minority equity
investment raise different control concerns, which may be reflected in
the corporate charter, partnership agreement, LLC operating
agreement, shareholders' agreement, or similar document. To the
extent the investing party has concerns about activities of the investee
company that relate to the operations of the alliance itself (for
example, marketing activities in a marketing alliance, licensing
restrictions in a development alliance, and concerns about change in
control of the other party), those concerns generally are not affected
by the amount or level of equity investment and are best dealt with in
the agreement governing that aspect of the relationship. There are,
however, control concerns that both the investor and investee have that
are directly related to the equity investment, and that may not be
appropriately dealt with in the corporate charter, partnership
agreement, or a shareholders' agreement.
Many investors will request the right to designate one or more
persons to serve as directors of the investee. Such a right may pose a
variety of issues when, as is typical, the investor is a customer of the
investee or a competitor or potential competitor of the investee or
other customers of the investee. Because of its board rights, the
investor will potentially have access to information sensitive to the
investee or other customers of the investee. Even if the investor does
not have a representative on the investee's board, it may have access
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to sensitive information through visitation rights or through financial
information covenants included in the stock purchase documentation or
as part of the investor's general rights as a stockholder of the investee.
In addition, the very fact that the investee has a relationship with the
investor may have a chilling effect on the investee's relationships with
competitors of the investor.
In order to address these concerns, the investee often will
negotiate restrictions on information to be provided to the investor
and/or its representatives on the investee's board. In addition,
agreements may be negotiated requiring the investor's designated
directors to excuse themselves from portions of board meetings at
which specified matters are discussed. Any such agreements must
delicately balance the desire of the investor for information relevant to
its investment, the desire of the investee to maintain the confidentiality
of such information and to maintain relationships with third parties,
and the fiduciary obligations of the investor's board representatives. If
appropriate restrictions are negotiated on the investor's access to
information, the investee may want to negotiate a clear understanding
that it can disclose the terms of the restrictions to other customers to
allay their concerns regarding the relationship between the investee
and the investor.
Another control concern arising in the minority investment
context is control over the business activities of the investee apart from
the subject matter of the alliance. As discussed above, bank
regulatory concerns may require the bank investor obtain from the
investee commitments to refrain from engaging in business activities
not permissible for banking organizations, lest the investor be required
by its regulators to divest its investment at a time and price that it (and
presumably the investee) regards as unfavorable.
The investor may prefer that these activity restrictions be
contained in governing documents (such as corporate charter,
partnership agreement or LLC operating agreement) to provide the
strongest layer of protection, although a provision in a binding
shareholders' agreement may be sufficient in many cases. The
principal issues relate to enforceability; the investor will prefer the
impermissible activities be beyond the power of the investee; if
reflected in a shareholders' agreement, there is risk that a court will
conclude that the investor has an adequate remedy at law and will
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refuse to order the investee to terminate the impermissible activities.
In certain circumstances, the investee may feel so strongly
about the need to retain the flexibility to engage in other businesses
that it is prepared to agree to buy out the investor's stake (assuming
that is acceptable to the investor and subject to resolution of any
disputes regarding value) or reject the equity investment altogether.
Where the investee is prepared to accept the restrictions, it will expect
the investor to exercise reasonable efforts to obtain regulatory
approval for the proposed new activities, but this raises other
questions. Who will bear the costs of obtaining regulatory approval?
Should the investor be required to sue its regulators to obtain
approval? Should the investor be required to shift the investment
within its corporate family to a location that may permit the broader
activities?
Other control concerns relate to maintenance of the investor's
position as a minority investor. For example, the investor may require
either veto power over new financings (particularly financings
involving securities senior to or pari passu with its securities or the
admission of competitors as investors) or a right of first refusal on
future financings, either to take the entire financing or to take up to an
amount that will maintain its pro rata ownership percentage. The
investor will be concerned about avoiding dilution from a cheap stock
price in future financings, which may or may not be adequately
reflected in the anti-dilution adjustment provisions of the investor's
convertible preferred stock or warrants (as applicable). The investor
may require first refusal rights on the securities of other investors.
The investor may be concerned about the transfer of securities to
competitors or loss of focus by the investee company. The investor
also will be concerned about remaining trapped in its minority
investment, requiring consideration of a right to sell its shares on a pro
rata basis with sales by other shareholders (a "co-sale" right) and the
various exit mechanisms discussed below.
The investee may insist on standstill restrictions on the ability
of the investor to acquire securities above a certain threshold.
Although that request may be motivated by a genuine concern on the
part of the investee that the investor will acquire control over the
company without having paid a control premium to all shareholders
and without the approval of the board of directors, the investee may
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also be concerned about market perception of that possibility (even if
the investee regards that as unlikely), both from the standpoint of
employees finding value in stock-based incentive programs and from
the standpoint of customers who are competitors of the investor. In
the latter case, it may be important to the long-term health of the
investee (and the long-term value of the investor's investment) that the
investee be able to reassure its employees and customers that, under
no circumstances, can the investor acquire control of the company and
be able to publicly disclose the terms of the standstill to provide that
reassurance.
Finally, the investor may desire the right to acquire the entire
company under certain circumstances. These provisions can be very
difficult to negotiate. The parties are unlikely to agree on a buy-out
price in advance, meaning the parties must either resort to a formula-
based option price or seek an appraisal of the company when the buy-
out option is invoked. In either case, the investee is justifiably
concerned that the buy-out price be high enough to provide meaningful
incentives for management and the employees to work hard for the
success of the venture. On the other hand, the investor wants the buy-
out price to be set at a price that is consistent with the middle range of
expectations for the company's performance over time, so the option,
in fact, will have value if the company exceeds expectations. In
addition, the investee is likely to object to such an option if it will
adversely affect its perception in the marketplace. More palatable to
the investee would be a provision granting the investor a right of first
offer for the entire company if and when the investee chooses to
pursue possible sale of the company of its own accord. Although the
investor may insist on a right of first refusal under those
circumstances, the investee will likely argue that a right of first refusal
will unnecessarily chill the bidding for the company and that the
investor should be prepared to offer the highest price for the company
if it expects to acquire the company.
B. Fiduciary Duties
In every strategic alliance, regardless of structure, there are
potential fiduciary duty issues to be addressed. In general, those
duties can be placed in two categories: duties an alliance participant
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owes to its own constituencies and duties an alliance participant owes
to the alliance and/or its alliance partners.
1. Duties to Own Constituencies
Nearly every alliance will have the result of impairing, to
some degree or another, the flexibility of an alliance partner to engage
in other activities, to acquire other entities or to be acquired. Alliance
features that lock in a party to the relationship or that preclude a party
from engaging in certain activities or utilizing its expertise on behalf
of others require consideration of fiduciary concerns.
As a general proposition, absent factors (such as conflicting
interests or threatened change in control of the company) that require a
more stringent judicial review of the decision-making process,
corporate decisions to acquire or dispose of lines of business, enter
into alliances, license technology or products, and agree to associated
restrictions on activities inconsistent with those decisions (e.g., non-
competition and non-solicitation covenants, exclusivity arrangements,
etc.) will generally be accorded the protections of the "business
judgment rule." The business judgment rule reflects courts'
recognition that they are not able to appraise accurately the issues of
value and business purpose subsumed within a board's decision, will
presumptively defer to the board's decision and will not examine the
merits of a decision so long as the board is informed and follows a
deliberative process in good faith.
The business judgment rule has been articulated by the courts
as a "presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." 18
If the business judgment rule is applicable, there is a presumption that
the board in making a business decision has acted in accordance with
its duties under the rule, and the burden is on the plaintiff to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the directors' decision was
primarily based on gross negligence (generally the absence of an
adequately informed decision), self-dealing, fraud, lack of good faith
or seeking to perpetuate themselves in office.
38. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
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The "duties" of the board required to be satisfied are generally
defined by the courts to include (i) being informed of all the material
information reasonably available, (ii) acting in good faith, (iii) not
having a conflict of interest, and (iv) making a rational decision that it
believes in good faith is in the best interests of the corporation and its
stockholders. 39  The keystone of the business judgment rule is the
board's being adequately informed. Counsel should take care to
ensure that the board has available to it information about the business
justification for the proposed alliance, including the relative value of
various alternatives to the alliance, and the implications of the
restrictions the company must agree to in order to obtain the benefits
of the alliance. Of particular concern are restrictions on the
company's flexibility to pursue other alternatives that, with the
passage of time, might appear more attractive than continued
participation in the alliance.
2. Duties to Alliance and Other Partners.
Where an alliance is predicated entirely on contractual
relationships, the parties will generally include broad language in the
alliance agreement to the effect that the parties do not intend to form
any sort of partnership, joint venture, or other common enterprise and
disclaiming any fiduciary relationships, whether that of agent and
principal, partners, co-venturers or otherwise. Such language is
generally regarded as reliable, as far as it goes, 40 and the only
constraints on their activities vis-h-vis each other should be those
found in the alliance contract (including any covenants that may be
implied at law) and in applicable law generally governing the rights of
commercial parties, such as laws against unfair trade practices and the
protections available under federal copyright, trademark and patent
protections.
Where, however, the parties form a separate entity, whether a
39. See id.
40. Cf. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 696 F. Supp. 57 (D. Del. 1988)
(holding that despite characterization of relationship with bottlers as a "special
partnership," the parties were not partners or joint venturers because the necessary




corporation, general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability
partnership or limited liability company, various fiduciary concerns
arise with respect to self-dealing transactions between partners and the
venture, usurpation of "corporate" opportunities by partners, and the
duties of representatives of the partners serving on the governing
board of the venture.
The law is reasonably clear that a general partner owes
fiduciary duties both to the partnership and to each other partner. 41 It
is also reasonably clear that the partnership agreement may be varied
by agreement.42 The willingness of the courts to respect the partners'
right to modify traditional concepts of fiduciary duty by contract gives
real meaning to the principle of freedom of contract.4 3
The "corporate opportunity" doctrine is an aspect of the duty
of loyalty. 44 The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a fiduciary from
appropriating "something for himself that, in all fairness, should
belong to the corporation." 45  The corporate opportunity doctrine
41. See, e.g., In Re USACafes, 600 A.2d 43 (Del. Ch. 1991) (explaining the
fiduciary duty in the nature of the duty of loyalty owed to limited partnership and limited
partners); Boxer v. Husky, 429 A.2d 995 (Del. Ch. 1981) (holding that under the
Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act-as adopted in both
Delaware and Colorado- general partners owed a fiduciary duty to the limited partners
and the duty was comparable to the fiduciary duty owed by corporate directors to
shareholders). It is less clear that a limited partner owes fiduciary duties, by analogy to
stockholders of a corporation, who usually (though not always) owe no fiduciary duties.
Cf. KE Property Management, Inc. v. 275 Madison Management Corp., C.A. No. 12683,
1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 147, at *25 (Del. Ch. July 21, 1993) ("to the extent that a
partnership agreement empowers a limited partner discretion to take actions affecting the
governance of the limited partnership, the limited partner may be subject to the obligations
of a fiduciary").
42. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 17-1101(d) (codifying the Delaware Revised
Uniform Limited Partnership Act and stating that the partnership can be "expanded or
restricted by providing in the partnership agreement").
43. See, e.g., In Re Cencom Cable Income Partners, Consolidated C.A. No. 14634,
1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 17, at *10-11 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 1996) (recognizing that the ability
to modify fiduciary duties in limited partnerships through contract is provided for in the
Delaware Limited Partnership Act).
44. See, e.g., Science Accessories Corp. v. Summgraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957, 963
(Del. 1980) (describing the doctrine of corporate opportunity); see also Stephen I. Glover,
Joint Ventures and Opportunity Doctrine Problems, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1995, at 9
(concluding that the corporate opportunities doctrine case law does not provide
participants in joint ventures with sufficient guidance on allocating new opportunities).
45. Equity Corp. v. Milton, 221 A.2d 494, 497 (Del. 1966).
[W]hen there is presented to a corporate officer a business opportunity
which the corporation is financially able to undertake, and which, by
its nature, falls into the line of the corporation's business and is of
practical advantage to it, or is an opportunity in which the corporation
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should be equally applicable to partnerships, subject to the right of the
partners to modify those obligations by contract.4 6  Parties
contemplating a venture and desiring to set forth by contract their
agreement regarding the scope of any restrictions on competitive
activities would be well advised to disclaim the corporate opportunity
doctrine in the governing documents for the venture.
Because of the potential competitive issues that may evolve
between alliance participants and (i) the alliance itself and (ii) other
participants, it is important that the organizational documents deal with
the responsibilities of participants and participant personnel to the
alliance. Participants should have a clear understanding at the outset
of the alliance of the limitations that they and other participants have
(if any) with regard to participation in activities competitive with the
alliance either directly or indirectly (e.g., through another alliance).
In addition, the organizational documents should clearly define the
obligations of participant personnel who are also officers or directors
of the alliance with regard to the use of information generated by the
alliance. Finally, the negotiation of organizational documents are the
best chance that minority participants may have to obtain agreement
from dominant or majority participants as to their obligations to the
alliance and the minority participants.
has an actual or expectant interest, the officer is prohibited from
permitting his self-interest to be brought into conflict with the
corporation's interest and may not take the opportunity for himself...
• A corollary of the... rule is that when a business opportunity
comes to a corporate officer, which, because of the nature of the
opportunity, is not one which is essential or desirable for his
corporation to embrace, being an opportunity in which it has no actual
or expectant interest, the officer is entitled to treat the business
opportunity as his own and the corporation has no interest in it,
provided the officer has not wrongfully embarked the corporation's
resources in order to acquire the business opportunity.
Id. See also Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154-55 (Del. 1996); Guth v.
Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
46. See, e.g., Universal Studios, Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 705 A.2d 579, 593 (Del. Ch.
1997) (discussing duties imposed by the parties' contractual agreement); U.S. West, Inc.
v. Time Warner Inc., C.A. No. 14555, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 55 (Del. Ch. June 6, 1996)
(dealing with a claim challenging managing general partner's acquisition of competing
corporation as breach of duty of loyalty; although "corporate opportunity" doctrine was
generally applicable to limited partnerships due to the similarity of the fiduciary duties,




As noted above, counsel should seek in the alliance agreement
to provide clear allocations of decision making authority for most
aspects of an alliance. To the extent that shared decision making is
crucial to the success of most ventures, the parties must leave certain
decisions (generally the most significant decisions) for joint
determination. Disputes will arise and deadlock is always possible.
The creation of dispute resolution processes and techniques, as
well as the implications of failure to resolve disputes, are best
addressed at the time of the alliance's creation rather than when issues
arise and relations are strained. Trying to address these issues when
the parties are in substantial dispute with respect to various aspects of
their business and one party is dependent upon the other for key
functions is extremely difficult. If extended deadlock would permit
either or both parties to terminate the alliance, exercise buy/sell
options, or otherwise impose a disproportionate hardship on one party,
the other party may perceive a tactical advantage in permitting (or
arranging) for deadlock, counting on the risk and consequences of
deadlock to encourage the other party to make concessions during the
life of the alliance. The other party should explore possible deadlock
resolution mechanisms with that party prior to entering into the
alliance, if for no other reason than to see what life would be like
partnered with a company so inclined to exercise its economic power.
Effective dispute resolution requires, to the extent practicable,
that disputes be resolved as quickly as possible, without formal
litigation (and arbitration for this purpose can be considered litigation)
and with a minimum of damage to the relationship. The parties should
strive to create procedures, such as escalation through operational and
management levels ("up the food chain") and mediation, that force
each party's personnel to discuss the dispute with their counterparts at
the other party and preclude litigation until deadlock has been reached
at the highest management levels. The parties may choose to create a
joint operating committee for the alliance (regardless of whether the
alliance otherwise has a formal structure) with a rotating (yearly)
chairmanship having certain powers to break a deadlock.
If arbitration is a preferred final resort, the parties should
consider the possible merits of short-form "baseball" arbitration,
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where the arbitrator is required to pick one party's position. Such an
approach would tend to encourage parties to take more reasonable
positions than "traditional" arbitration, where the arbitrators are
essentially unconstrained in their choice of outcomes and may be
inclined to "cut the baby in half," a possibility which would tend to
reward those who take unreasonable positions. Where traditional
binding arbitration is utilized, the parties should recognize that the
arbitrators are better able to resolve contract interpretation issues than
purely business disagreements.
D. Reasonable Exit Strategies
Circumstances change and the needs of the parties change.
Even the best alliances terminate at some point. Like pre-nuptial
agreements, termination is a topic that most business people would
prefer to avoid during their initial courtship, but really should not.
The parties should carefully consider and specify: (i) under what
circumstances may a party terminate; (ii) whether the entire
relationship will terminate or only certain aspects (product-by-product,
geographically) and (iii) what are the costs and consequences of
termination (e.g., what rights, licenses and obligations cease, survive
or arise upon termination). Termination should not necessarily be
easy, but should be fair and reasonable to the parties.
Most every alliance agreement will specify some outside date
at which the alliance will, unless extended by the parties, terminate.
The parties should aim for this time period to be long enough to give
the alliance time to accomplish its goals. If the alliance is intended to
achieve identifiable milestones during its development, extension of
the alliance may be automatic upon achievement of designated
milestones by certain dates.
The alliance agreement also generally will provide that the
alliance may be terminated by one party in the event of repeated
material breaches of the agreement by the other party. Given the
long-term nature of an alliance and the need for the parties to
cooperate, no alliance agreement should permit "hair-trigger"
termination, but should provide adequate dispute resolution
mechanisms and remedies short of termination for relatively
immaterial breaches, for which some scale of liquidated damages may
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be sufficient, or even for material breaches that cannot be cured, but
that are innocent and compensable by payment of damages to the
injured party.
Many alliance agreements provide that either or both parties
may terminate the alliance in the event it or the other party
experiences a change of control. The motivations here vary. The
party experiencing the change in control may desire the flexibility to
be acquired by a company that cannot (or will not) abide by the
restrictions in the alliance agreement. This is often the case in
exclusive marketing alliance agreements, where the exclusivity
obligation of the acquired company cannot be permitted to "pollute"
the other businesses of the buyer. Similarly, the other party may not
be interested in doing business with the acquiror, either because it is a
competitor or is otherwise an unattractive alliance partner.
The parties may agree that they will each have relative
freedom to terminate participation in the alliance, subject to advance
notice requirements and settlement of the respective obligations of the
parties. The non-terminating party would expect full reimbursement
of the financial investment it has made in the alliance and the
terminating party to relinquish any claims it may have in alliance work
product, which may or may not be appropriate given the parties'
relative contributions to the alliance.
Reciprocal buy/sell and put/call options represent both
termination techniques and liquidity vehicles for venture participants.
In a buy/sell arrangement, one of the parties establishes a price for a
unit of equity and the other party must either buy the selling interest or
sell its own interest at that unit price. Should there be three or more
participants, the procedures of the buy/sell arrangement become more
complex. Buy-sell provisions often contain an auction provision,
under which the second participant states that it is willing to buy, but
only at a price slightly higher (e.g., 3%) than the price named by the
first participant. The first participant then has the opportunity to
respond by indicating whether it wants to buy or sell. If it wants to
buy, it must raise the price by the same amount again (e.g., 3%).
This process continues until one party agrees to sell. In certain
circumstances, the parties may desire the venture to have first right to
purchase a tendered interest, in order to avoid disruption of the other
parties' relative percentage interests.
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Although buy/sell arrangements are facially neutral, they are
very sensitive in operation to the number of parties and the relative
financial resources of the parties. Too often one sees buy/sell options
that, in practice, given the relative size and resources of the parties,
can have only one result: sale of the smaller company's stake to the
larger company. Techniques to mitigate the effects of disparate
resources can include providing for an extended period during which
the smaller party may attempt to find financing for the purchase,
providing for the larger party to finance the purchase, providing for a
minimum buy-out price, and specifying a date several years out prior
to which the buy/sell option may not be exercised.
To the extent a proposed equity investment is "staged" over a
period of time or by achievement of specified milestones, termination
of the alliance may also terminate the obligation to make the
investment. Under those circumstances, the investor may desire the
right to accelerate its investment, if the investee otherwise appears to
be an attractive investment at the negotiated price, even at the risk of
having to forego some of its preferential control rights discussed
above. Similarly, depending on the circumstances of termination, the
investee may want the right to call the remaining investment, but may
have to agree to a corresponding put right for the investor, which may
be unattractive.
Depending on the form of the alliance, termination may
require liquidation or sale of the alliance, which raises the issue
whether either party, due to the circumstances surrounding
termination, should be prohibited from purchasing assets of the
venture. One study found that of ventures that were terminated, more
than 75 % were acquired by one of the partners.47 In addition to the
self-dealing concerns and concerns about rewarding a guilty party,
termination of the venture may result in one or both parties losing
rights to valuable intellectual property. In short, there is no substitute
for careful delineation in the alliance agreement of who has what
rights in the assets of the alliance upon termination.
Liquidation of the alliance would normally return each
participant's original assets, with the remaining assets (if any) to be
shared proportionally. This method must, of course, eliminate all of
47. See Bleeke & Ernst, supra note 5, at 130.
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the liabilities of the alliance. This is particularly effective where it is
contemplated that goodwill might not develop if the alliance is not
successful or where one of the parties is essential to the alliance and
the others are not.
It may be very important to provide a "cooling off" period
during which none of the termination arrangements are available to
cause the parties to attempt to make the alliance work. This may also
be true for "calls" where there may be a period of time when the
venture is worth very little and then significantly gains value.
Not every exit strategy necessarily requires termination of the
alliance. If the alliance includes a minority equity investment by one
party in the other, the investee may be willing to permit the investor to
monetize its investment without termination of the alliance. In this
regard, the interests of the investor and the investee are not materially
different from those of parties to any equity financing arrangement,
such as a venture capital financing. The investor is concerned about
liquidity, specifically the ability to sell when and to whom desired, the
availability of a liquid (i.e., public) market for the securities and, if
necessary, the right to require the investee to register resales of the
investor's shares under federal and state securities laws. The
investee's concerns are the stability of the market for its stock, the
disruption and expense associated with registering shares for resale,
and the possibility that the chosen purchaser for the shares might be
objectionable to the investee. The only issue that is particularly
unique is the possible loss of the validation (or "marquee") benefits
associated with the investor's investment in the company, although
there may be circumstances where the validation benefits have been
realized and the investee now perceives the continued investment as an
adverse characteristic and would encourage disposition of the
investor's stake.
E. Liability Allocation
Certain activities may expose the bank to unacceptable risks,
even though they could be conducted within the bank. Common
examples are real estate holdings, which may include not only
foreclosed properties but the bank's own facilities. Claims that result
from the ownership or operation of properties or other businesses
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outside the scope of the bank's core business may be moved outside
the bank to protect the institution.
Although limited partners enjoy limited liability, a limited
partnership is not likely to be a suitable format for a business alliance
because all of the participants desire to be involved in the business.
Generally, in a partnership all of the partners are liable for the debts
of the partnership. On the other hand, shareholders of a corporation
are generally not liable for the debts of the corporation. Liability in
the partnership alliance, however, can be easily avoided by having
each participant create its own wholly owned corporation to serve as
the alliance partner of a general partnership. This shields each
participant and its assets from liability for the alliance's obligations
while maintaining the tax benefits of a partnership.
If a separate entity is not being formed, a technology firm will
generally want to limit its risk. A technology firm will often be
unwilling or unable to accept potentially unlimited risk for a product
sold at a relatively modest unit price. Relative bargaining strengths of
the participants will, of course, play a role in risk allocation. The use
of interim testing, phased introductions, third party insurance or other
devices can allow the parties to quantify, limit and address the
liabilities and risks associated with a particular technology, product or
service."
F. Bank Regulatory Concerns
On the one hand, limitations on permissible activities, the
form, and level of permissible equity investments, and flexibility
regarding operational control will limit a firm's choice of alliance
structure. Many regulatory barriers have become increasingly
flexible, however, because of the rapid pace of technological
innovation. The financial services industry today is experiencing the
most accommodating regulatory environment in decades. Regulators
seem prepared to approve virtually any type of relationship between a
financial institution and a technology company if the objective is to
allow the financial institution to take advantage of the technological
48. See John L. Douglas, Structuring Relationships Between Banks and Technology
Companies: Pitfalls from the Perspective of the Banking Lawyer, 2 ELEC. BANKING L. &
COM. REP. 1 (1998).
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prowess of the company to further its banking and related businesses.
The array of permissible structural alternatives for non-
banking activities and investments by banking organization is vast, and
the regulatory framework can be incredibly complex. The basic
alternatives revolve around a few simple variables: will the
activities/investment be housed in the bank or out of the bank; if out of
the bank, in a holding company subsidiary or in a bank subsidiary; and
will the activities/investment be controlling or non-controlling or
jointly controlled?
1. Contract Issues
Perhaps the most straightforward form of alliance is simply a
contractual arrangement, such as a joint development or licensing
agreement, marketing agreement or outsourcing agreement. There are
certain statutory and regulatory provisions to keep in mind in the
contracting area.
Contractual arrangements entered into by a bank and a third
party may create regulatory oversight. The Bank Service Corporation
Act has a relatively peculiar provision stating as follows:
[W]henever a bank that is regularly examined by an
appropriate Federal banking agency, or any subsidiary
or affiliate of such bank that is subject to examination
by that agency, causes to be performed for itself, by
contract or otherwise, any services authorized under
this chapter, whether on or off its premises -
(1) such performance shall be subject to regulation and
examination by such agency to the same extent as if
such services were being performed by the bank itself
on its own premises, and
(2) the bank shall notify such agency of the existence of
the service relationship within thirty days after the
making of such service contract or the performance of
the service, whichever comes first.49
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1867(c) (1994).
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Although not all contracts with non-bank providers are subject
to this provision, to the extent that a bank has contracted out its back-
office processing, customer service operations, or other banking
functions to a third party, the bank regulators will want to have the
right to examine the activities to assure that they are being conducted
properly and appropriately.
In an Interpretive Letter, the OCC stated that the right under
the Bank Service Corporation Act to oversee these nonbank providers
of services is "probably narrower" than the authority to examine a
bank and its subsidiaries. It went on to state that it was probably only
the "performance" of the services that would be subject to
examination and regulation.50
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) also has
the right, under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvements Act of 1991 (FDICIA), to address contracts. Under
section 30 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), a bank
may not enter into a written or oral contract with any person to
provide goods, products, or services to or for the benefit of such bank
"if the performance of the contract would adversely affect the safety
and soundness of the institution." ' The FDIC is given the authority
to promulgate regulations implementing the prohibition of the statute.
Although regulations were proposed, the FDIC had a difficult time
defining the types of contracts that fell within the prohibition. While
the regulation was withdrawn, apparently because "the existence of
adverse contracts has decreased considerably since the proposed rule
was issued for comment, and because of overwhelmingly negative
comments received, "5 the lingering power of the FDIC to address
these adverse contracts by order must be respected.
Certain contractual structures in the marketing arena raise
some special concerns.
Percentage Leases. Banks are generally able to rent lobby
space to non-bank providers of services, either on a flat fee basis or a
50. OCC Interpretive Letter (July 26, 1989) (unpublished), available in LEXIS,
Bankng Library, ALLOCC File (addressing the scope of the OCC's oversight with respect
to CHIPS-the Clearing House Interbank Payments System-and SWIFT-Society for
Worldwide Financial Telecommunications).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1831g (1994).
52. See Contracts Adverse to Safety and Soundness of Insured Depository Institutions,
60 Fed. Reg. 24,296, 24,303 (1995).
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percentage rent basis. This arrangement allows a bank to provide,
through a third party, additional products and services to its customers
on its premises, and to benefit financially through the arrangement. It
may solidify customer relationships, allow the more productive use of
retail floor space, and provide an additional source of fee income.
The leasing arrangements are useful in areas where the
investment to create a fully competitive product is too high for the
banking organization, where regulatory constraints prohibit or impede
the offering of the product directly, or where a third party provider
has significant marketplace advantages over the bank. Accordingly,
leasing arrangements have been used with securities, insurance, travel
agencies, and various other businesses.
The OCC approved percentage lease arrangements in
December 1983, noting that leasing excess space "was merely an
incident to the banking business," and stating that the bank should be
able to spread expenses and operating costs by renting excess space to
a variety of tenants without restriction. The OCC recognized that it
was possible to structure a lease arrangement so that the bank might be
construed as entering into a joint venture or partnership with the non-
bank provider, which would raise other issues and could even be
impermissible. Such concerns could arise if the lease rate were
unusually high or the terms and conditions of the lease gave the bank
effective control over the operations of the lessee. Accordingly, the
OCC indicated that national banks should contract on terms and
conditions customary in the field of commercial leasing. 
5 3
Based on the OCC guidance, the OCC has permitted lease
arrangements with insurance agencies, securities brokers and
investment advisors, and indeed has stated that a national bank may
enter a percentage lease with any business." Accordingly, a bank may
53. OCC Interpretive Letter 274, Percentage Leasing on National Bank Premises to
Insurance Agent Does Not Create Partnership, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 85,438 (Dec. 2, 1983). The OCC also indicated that certain terms
ought to be incorporated in the arrangement, including: (i) language specifically negating
the creation of a joint venture or partnership; (ii) language expressly stating that the bank
would not be liable for the debts or liabilities of the lessee; (iii) separate identification of
the non-banking company, with disclosures to avoid customer confusion; (iv) appropriate
advertising, indicating the separate and independent ownership and operation of the
business; and (v) an arm's length lessor-lessee relationship. See id.
54. See OCC No Objection Letter 87-8, Leasing Branch Office Space to Corporation
Offering Residential and Commercial Real Estate Brokerage and Consulting Services,
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enter an arrangement with essentially any retail organization in order
to expand the products and services offered to its customers.
Somewhat ironically, banks are entering lease arrangements
with other businesses as lessees, in order to gain access to the
customers of other businesses. The most prevalent example is the
grocery store branch, where the bank will typically lease a modest
amount of space and establish a branch operation. The in-store branch
operates not only as a convenience for existing bank customers, it
provides a meaningful opportunity to attract new customers.
Essentially the same principles that permit a bank to sub-lease space to
non-bank businesses also permit a bank to lease space from non-bank
businesses.
Dual Employees. Banks have expanded on the lease
arrangement by coupling the lease with provisions where the bank and
non-bank entity share employees. These employees may be either
back-office employees, involved in clerical or administrative
functions, or they may be sales agents or representatives offering the
products and services to customers. 55
The dual employee relationships raise a series of concerns
regarding separateness of the businesses of the lessee and the bank.
Written contracts, specifically stating duties, responsibilities, control
and compensation, are required. The bank should have no duty or
obligation to monitor or control the employees while engaging in their
duties on behalf of the lessee. None of the bank's other employees
should be providing services to the lessee. If the employee is to
engage in activities on the bank's premises, the activities must be
limited to those that would be permissible for the national bank.
However, it should be noted that the OCC has also stated that a
national bank employee can also act as agent for another entity, even if
the activity is impermissible, so long as the bank receives no share of
the profits resulting from the employee's activities on behalf of
another, and the activity does not constitute an unsafe and unsound
banking practice.
5 6
[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,037 (Nov. 17, 1987).
55. See INVEST Securities Brokerage Program, 4-3 0.C.C. Q.J. 67 (Sept. 1985)
[hereinafter INVEST Letter].
56. See Letter from Ford Barrett, OCC Assistant Chief Counsel, to Max Repermeiner
(July 23, 1982) (on file with authors).
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The other federal banking agencies have taken positions with
respect to leases and employee sharing that are fairly consistent with
the OCC statements. The FDIC has cautioned regarding the need for
adequate contractual limitations on liability to avoid concerns
regarding the bank's exposure to the activity.
States have expressed concern about leasing and employee
sharing, particularly in the insurance area. A number of states have
anti-affiliation statutes, prohibiting in various forms the combination of
banking and insurance agency activities.57 Certain of these states have
viewed the leasing and employee sharing arrangements as attempts to
circumvent the anti-affiliation laws.
Sales of Customer Lists or Referral Fees. Although a bank
may be precluded from engaging in an activity directly, banks have
historically been able to act as a finder or referral source for a fee, and
have been able to sell customer lists and other information. Such
arrangements can allow access to the customer base in exchange for
additional fee income, providing advantages to the bank without any
capital investment.
The OCC has stated that a national bank may act as a finder
for companies offering financial and non-financial products or
services.58 While the bank must limit its activities to those of a
"finder," and may not become involved in negotiating the actual sale
of the product or service, it does allow the bank to participate to some
degree in an activity that may be otherwise prohibited.
Banks have used the authority to act as finder in merger and
acquisition transactions, real estate transactions and other service
functions. The OCC permitted a national bank to act as a finder in
informing its customers of automobile club memberships, assisting
them in ifiling out applications, and otherwise facilitating the matching
of the bank's customers with the automobile club. 9
Banks can sell or lease their customer lists to non-bank
providers, who in turn will solicit the bank's customers, typically by
57. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 33-3-23 (1998) (restricting insurance transactions by
lending institutions and bank holding companies).
58. See OCC Interpretive Rule on Finder Activities, 12 C.F.R. § 7.7200 (1998).
59. See OCC No Objection Letter 89-02, National Bank Offering Automobile Club
Membership Program to Its Customers, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 83,014 (Apr. 17, 1989).
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mail or by telephone. The OCC allows such activities so long as there
are no tie-in arrangements with the non-bank provider. The OCC is
concerned that customers will believe that they might be forced to
acquire the non-bank product or service as a condition to obtaining
some service from the bank or in exchange for more favorable
treatment from the bank.
Similar to the sale of the customer list, banks are permitted to
include promotional materials from non-bank providers in mailings to
their customers. These "statement stuffers" allow banks to capitalize
on their customer relationships, hopefully in an appropriate manner.
Banks, of course, will want to review and approve the materials sent,
and will be rightfully concerned regarding the nature of the product or
service offered. Banks may be compensated either on a flat fee basis
or on some basis relative to the success of the solicitation. 60
2. Minority Equity Investment Issues
Investing in equity securities of an alliance partner (or any
other person) through the bank is difficult. National banks in general
are precluded from owning common or preferred stock for investment
purposes, 6' and state banks may not make any minority equity
investment impermissible for national banks. 62  There are three
avenues for minority equity investments, however, that may be
available: through a bank holding company, through an operating
subsidiary of a national bank, or through an SBIC.
Minority Investments under the BHCA. Section 4(c)(6) of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended (BHCA),63 allows a
bank holding company to acquire shares of a company engaged in non-
bank activities without approval of the Federal Reserve Board (Board)
so long as the ownership interest is less than 5% of the voting shares
60. See OCC Interpretive Letter 339, Bank May Market Tour Packages to Its
Customers, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,509 (May 16,
1985).
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1994).
62. See id. § 1831a.
63. See id. § 1841 et seq. The BHCA generally imposes strict limits on the ability of
a bank holding company to engage in activities, either directly or through a subsidiary, by
limiting the activities of a bank holding company to those of banking or of managing or
controlling banks or so closely related to the business of banking or of managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto. See id. § 1843(c).
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of the company. 64 This leeway investment authority allows a bank
holding company to make smaller equity investments in companies.65
Because the Board does not want to allow these minority
investments to become a substitute for more active or controlling
investments, it has traditionally imposed two additional limitations.
First, the minority investment must be passive, and may not be used in
a way that allows the investing bank holding company to participate
actively in the business. When a group of 20 bank holding companies
each proposed to invest in 5 % of the outstanding voting shares of an
insurance entity with the intent of participating in certain underwriting
and related activities, the Board determined that the BHCA section
4(c)(6) exemption was not available. It went on to state that the
exemption was only available for passive investments. 
66
Second, the investment, regardless of how structured, cannot
give the investor effective control over the company or permit it to
exercise a controlling interest over the management or policies of the
company. Various bank holding companies have attempted to expand
the limits of permissible investments under the BHCA, and have
attempted to stretch the less than 5 % voting share exemption to its
fullest (and beyond).
One common structure was to combine the less than 5 % voting
interests with large non-voting interests, contractual provisions
granting control or options, warrants or other interests that provided
strong assurances of compliance with the will of the investor. The
Board has indicated that many of these provisions can create effective
control or, at the least, may amount to impermissible controlling
influence over management and policies.67
64. Id. § 1843(c)(6).
65. See, e.g., NationsBank Corp., 80 Fed. Res. Bull. 154 (1994) (involving debt
financing combined with warrants to acquire 24.9% of the borrower's voting shares).
66. 12 C.F.R. § 225.137 (1998); see also FRB Interpretive Letter 4-338.2 (January
22, 1986), available in LEXIS, Bankng Library, ALLFED File; Insurance
Underwriting-Investment in Nonbank Company, 4 Fed. Res. Reg .Service 4-600.1
(1986).
67. See Policy Statement on Nonvoting Equity Investments by Bank Holding
Companies, 12 C.F.R. § 225.143 (1998); Statement of Policy on Nonvoting Equity
Investments by Bank Holding Companies, 68 Fed. Res. Bull. 413 (1982) [hereinafter
Nonvoting Equity Investments]; Michael S. Heifer and Russell J. Bruemmer, Interstate
Nonvoting Equity Agreements and "Control" Under the BHCA, 39 Bus. LAW. 383 (1984);
Letter from FRB to Richard S. Simmons, (July 8, 1982) (on file with Board) (discussing
investment proposal of Chemical New York Corp. and Florida National Banks of
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The earliest statements from the Board related to non-voting
equity investments by bank holding companies in other banks or bank
holding companies. Often described as "stake out" investments, these
investments were intended to give the investing bank holding company
an effective leg up on subsequent acquisitions when interstate banking
became legal and the acquisition could finally be consummated. In a
policy statement issued in 1982, the Board stated that a less than 5%
voting interest, when combined with an investment in non-voting
securities of less than 25 % of the total equity, could be consistent with
the BHCA. However, the Board warned that restrictions on the ability
of the acquiree to sell or transfer shares or assets of its subsidiaries or
otherwise restrict the rights of the owners of the shares of the acquiree
could result in impermissible control. The Board indicated that
various covenants or contractual provisions could not impermissibly
limit the existing management's control over operations, policies, or
business decisions. The Board also indicated that contractual
provisions that substantially hindered the acquisition of the target by a
third party would be disfavored.68
On the other hand, the Board has indicated that if the total
equity investment remains below 25 %, if any shares must be sold in a
public offering of wide distribution, and if the target can terminate the
agreement on reasonable terms and conditions, the arrangement is
more likely to be acceptable. The Board indicated that each such
arrangement must be evaluated individually, and requested that parties
contemplating such arrangements should first consult with the Board.
The ability to use the minority investment provisions of the
BHCA while following the Federal Reserve's guidelines for nonvoting
equity investments provides significant advantages in certain
Florida).
68. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.143; Nonvoting Equity Investments, supra note 67. Other
items that the Board has indicated may be impermissible include: (i) the acquisition of
shares which are non-voting only in the hands of the bank holding company, and which
become voting when transferred to a third party (the Board indicated that the ability to
control the transfer of voting shares may constitute control over those shares);
(ii) contractual provisions limiting discretion with respect to normal management
decisions, such as sale of assets, dividends, mergers or acquisitions, or the like;
(iii) entering into a merger agreement with an unusually long period for consummation,
without providing a mechanism for the target to terminate the agreement; and
(iv) agreements giving control over the selection of directors, the voting of shares or other
corporate matters, or requiring that the target consult with the investor prior to taking
certain significant actions. See id.
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situations. While the bank holding company cannot take too active a
role in the business, the ability to make an investment and participate
in its growth can be very useful. 69
Bank Operating Subsidiaries. The bank operating subsidiary,
in spite of the apparent restrictions that appear from the OCC's
operating subsidiary regulations,7 ° is an extraordinarily useful vehicle
for structuring arrangements with non-bank providers. 7' Although the
regulations would appear to require that a bank own not less than 50%
of the subsidiary, 72 no such limitation is recognized in actual practice.
The OCC has approved a number of arrangements in the past through
operating subsidiaries where the operating subsidiary's investment was
less than 50%.7' The principal determination of permissibility relates
to the nature of the activity itself.
The determining criteria are: first, whether the activity is
69. See FRB Interpretive Letter (Nov. 25, 1986), available in LEXIS, Bankng
Library, ALLFED File (approving, subject to conditions, Sumitomo's acquisition of a
24.9% nonvoting interest in Goldman Sachs, subject to numerous restrictions on common
activities).
70. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 5 (1998).
71. Although the OCC's regulations speak in terms of subsidiary corporations, the
OCC has approved banks' participation in an operating subsidiary structured as a limited
liability company, and has allowed banks to be limited partners in a partnership. The
OCC cannot approve a bank becoming a general partner in a partnership, due to concerns
relating to the unlimited liability of a partner, see Merchants National Bank v. Wehrman,
202 U.S. 295 (1906), but has allowed banks to establish a corporate subsidiary to serve as
the general partner of a partnership.
72. See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2) (1998). Prior to 1997, the regulation required that the
parent bank own at least 80% of the voting stock of the subsidiary.
73. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter 697, Approves Indirect Ownership of 25% of a
State Chartered Trust Co., [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
81,012 (Nov. 15, 1995) (approving 25% shareholder interest in trust company); OCC
Interpretive Letter 689, A National Bank Was Authorized to Hold a 60 Percent Share,
Through an Operating Subsidiary, in a Limited Liability CompanyThat Processed Credit
Card Sales Transactions for Merchants, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 81-004 (Aug. 9, 1995) (addressing proposed 60% interest in LLC); OCC
Interpretive Letter 517, Banks Permitted to Establish Operating Subsidiary to form
Partnership with Affilate of Investment Bank, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCII) 83,228 (Aug. 16, 1990) (approving 17% interest as general partner of
one partnership, 17% interest as limited partner in another partnership); OCC Interpretive
Letter 516, Subsidiary Permitted to be General Partner in Joint Venture Providing
Information Analysis and Execution Services, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCII) 83,220 (July 12, 1990) (discussing 17% interest as general partner with
four other partners); OCC Interpretive Letter 381, Bank Subsidiary's Participation in
Computer Processing and Automated Teller Machine Network Partnership, [1988-1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,605 (May 5, 1987) (allowing 33
1/3 % interest as general partner).
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permissible; second, whether the bank can limit the activities of the
investee company to those permissible for national banks; third,
whether the bank's liability is limited from both an accounting and a
legal perspective; and fourth, whether the investment is convenient or
useful to the bank in carrying out its business, and not merely a
passive investment unrelated to that bank's banking business.
Over the years, the OCC has permitted banks to form
operating subsidiaries to engage in and carry out permissible activities.
As long as the ownership is incidental to the banking business of the
bank, and not a "speculative" investment of the bank, the prohibitions
of section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act contained in 12 USC
24(Seventh) relating to stock ownership do not apply. This view is
consistent with an interpretive ruling of the OCC issued in 1966,
declaring that section 16 was not intended to prohibit, and did not
impair, the ability of national banks to "acquire and hold stock in
corporations as an incident to and to facilitate the banks' conduct of
their banking business." 74 This analysis applies to minority stock
purchases just as it applies to wholly owned operating subsidiaries.
We note that in that same year, the OCC permitted a bank to acquire a
minority interest in a credit card clearinghouse owned by a number of
institutions.75
The OCC has authorized similar arrangements for a wide
variety of activities, including equity investments in a corporation
operating a point of sale and ATM network; 76 in a corporation
providing advice on the government securities market; 77 in a
corporation affiliated with a captive insurer; 78 in a corporation
providing services to participants in government securities markets; 79
74. 12 C.F.R. § 7.10 (1966).
75. See Letter of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency (October 12, 1966)
(on file with OCC).
76. See OCC Interpretive Letter (Nov. 9, 1992), available in 1992 WL 486340
(discussing permissibility for national bank to invest or hold stock in particular company).
77. See OCC Interpretive Letter 543, Membership in Corporation of Primary Dealers
in Government Securities, [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
83,255 (Feb. 13, 1991).
78. See OCC Interpretive Letter 554, National Bank Purchasing Shares of Stock in a
Company Affiliated with an Industry Captive Insurance Company, When Such Purchase is
a Condition Precedent to the Obtaining of Insurance of the Captive, [1991-1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,301 (May 7, 1990).
79. See OCC Interpretive Letter 421, National Bank Investment in the Government
Securities Clearing Corporation, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
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and in a state chartered trust company."0
The second requirement is that the bank has the ability to limit
the investee company to bank-permissible activities. In past letters,
this requirement has been addressed in a number of ways. For
instance, in partnerships, the partnership agreement can provide that
the national bank retains a veto over new activities, and this is a
common requirement for partnerships. 8 While minority shareholders
in a corporation do not possess a veto power as a matter of corporate
law, there are other ways, principally by contract, of assuring that the
corporation does not engage in impermissible activities. A common
requirement is that the articles of incorporation or bylaws limit the
activities to those permissible for national banks. 82 The OCC recently
indicated that restricting activities through a shareholders' agreement
could also satisfy this requirement.
Banks normally satisfy the third requirement, that of limiting
liability, through using the corporate structure for their operating
subsidiaries. The corporate structure generally insulates the bank
from liability or loss beyond its investment in the shares of the
subsidiary.
3
Further, as minority investments in operating subsidiaries are
generally unconsolidated subsidiaries of the banks, the investment in
the operating subsidiary would be reported under the equity method of
accounting. This generally provides that losses in the subsidiary are
limited to the amount of the investment (including extensions of credit
or guarantees, if any, if shown on the investor's books).
8 4
The final requirement, that the investment must be convenient
or useful to the bank in carrying out its business, and not merely a
(CCH) 85,645 (Mar. 14, 1988).
80. See OCC Interpretive Letter 697, supra note 70, at 81,012.
81. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter 625, National Bank Permitted to Establish
Wholly-Owned Subsidiary to Participate, as a General Partner, in a Proposed General
Partnership with an Insurance Company Subsidiary to Offer Investment Products, [1993-
1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,507 (July 1, 1993).
82. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter, (Jan. 4, 1983) available in 1983 WL 145686
(stating that national bank may be member of corporation to operate ATM switch
network).
83. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 25 (rev. perm. ed. 1990).
84. See generally Accounting Principles Board, Op. 18, § 19 (1971) (discussing
equity method of accounting for investments in common stock).
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passive investment unrelated to that bank's banking business, requires
that a distinction be drawn between investments consistent with the
bank's business and plans, as opposed to investments made because
they are good investments. The OCC generally will require the bank
present the business reasons driving the bank to carry out its
businesses through the subsidiary.
The revisions to the OCC operating subsidiary regulations
indicate that the OCC will consider applications to engage in activities
that, while closely related to or incidental to the business of banking,
might not be permissible for national banks. Zions First National
Bank applied in early 1997 for authority to engage in the underwriting
of municipal revenue bonds, a power long sought by national banks,
but otherwise impermissible. On December 11, 1997, the
Comptroller approved the request, making an important statement
regarding the inherent flexibility of the national bank charter.8"
In June 1995, the OCC approved requests by BankAmerica
Corporation and NationsBank Corporation to establish operating
subsidiaries that in turn would acquire MECA. 86 MECA, using its
"Managing Your Money" software program as the basis for offering
home banking services, had entered several licensing and distribution
agreements with banks. The banks proposed to acquire MECA,
convert its ownership to a limited liability company, and continue the
activities of MECA related to home banking and financial management
services.
The OCC in its approval analyzed the intent and purpose
behind its requirements relating to data processing and related services
associated with banking, financial or other related economic data. The
OCC had little trouble with the home banking, financial management,
financial planning, investment analysis, tax estimation, and the other
components of the software provided by MECA. Nor did the OCC
have a problem with the ancillary services related to the foregoing,
including providing checks and other financial forms. The OCC
pointed to a number of prior approvals relating to such services. The
OCC also noted that its prior ruling allowed a national bank to use
85. See OCC Conditional Approval 262 (Dec. 11, 1997), available in LEXIS, Bankng
Library, ALLOCC File (expressing Comptroller's decision on the application by Zion's
First National Bank, SLC, Utah to commence new activities in an operating subsidiary).
86. See OCC Interpretive Letter 677, supra note 28.
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data processing equipment and technology to perform for itself or
others these financial services related to the business of banking.
Of particular interest in the approval was a discussion of the
ability to market the software to individuals or entities that were not
financial institutions and were not customers of either of the acquiring
institutions. The OCC noted that as most of the software in question
was financially related, it could permissibly be marketed to non-
customers. With respect to non-financial products that might have
been or might be developed, the OCC viewed them as permissible
"by-products" of the financial and banking products which the banks
were intimately involved in developing with MECA.
The request to the OCC asked for the ability to use MECA's
excess capacity in equipment, personnel, and facilities for the
production and distribution of some software products that might be
non-financial in nature. The OCC noted that approximately 25% of
the total units, and 7% of the total revenue, were non-financial in
nature. The OCC indicated that this excess capacity would diminish
over time. The OCC determined that this was a permissible use of the
excess capacity, pointing to earlier letters allowing marketing of
records management systems manuals and supply and purchasing
manuals as part of permissible data processing activities, allowing the
acquisition of equipment with excess capacity, and allowing the resale
of excess long lines telecommunications capacity. The OCC
analogized the use and sale of the excess capacity to the ability of a
national bank to lease excess real property to other businesses.
Accordingly, while the OCC imposed the typical conditions
(charter limited to bank-permissible activities, the ability of the banks
to withdraw if the company engaged in impermissible activities, and
no liability on the part of the banks for the debts, liabilities or
obligations of the company), the flexibility to actually engage in
impermissible activities was not insubstantial.
Other OCC interpretive letters indicate perhaps an even greater
willingness to accommodate activities that might otherwise seem to
pose problems. In a letter dated August 19, 1996, the OCC indicated
that a national bank could act as an Internet service provider in
connection with its home banking service.87 The bank wished to offer
87. See OCC Interpretive Letter 742, A National Bank's Subsidiary Could Provide
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home banking services to its customers and believed that it needed to
offer an Internet access option for that service. The OCC determined
that the Internet access service was incidental to the home banking
service, and allowed the bank to provide such service to customers and
non-customers alike. The OCC has allowed a bank to design and
operate toll booths on a toll road, determining that the collection and
transmission of funds was a part of the business of banking, and in
connection therewith the bank could design and contract out the
building of the toll booths and related devices. 88
Of potentially more interest and importance is the recent OCC
letter approving Integrion Financial Network's acquisition of warrants
to acquire shares of common stock of CheckFree Corporation. 89
Integrion, itself the subject of an OCC letter dealing with permissible
activities of operating subsidiaries of national banks, entered into a
strategic alliance (essentially a servicing alliance, in the terminology
used in this article) with CheckFree. In connection with the alliance,
Integrion was granted warrants permitting it to acquire approximately
6% of the outstanding stock of CheckFree, and could earn additional
warrants permitting it to acquire up to 16% of the outstanding stock.
The investment was clearly non-controlling, and although CheckFree
engaged in only bank-permissible processing activities, there was no
assurance that it would continue to do so.
The OCC addressed the possibility of non-permissible
activities by (i) requiring Integrion to monitor the activities of
CheckFree, and to advise the OCC when or if CheckFree commenced
engaging in impermissible activities; (ii) deferring the determination of
how much in the way of impermissible activities would cause the OCC
to require Integrion to cease its investment relationship with
CheckFree; and (iii) granting Integrion a two year period in which to
divest shares of CheckFree if the OCC determined divestiture were to
be required due to CheckFree's impermissible activities. The OCC
Home Banking Services Through a Direct and Internet Connection to tile Bank's Home
Banking System and, Non-Bank Customers in the Bank's Service Areas, [1996-1997
Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-106 (Aug. 19, 1996).
88. See OCC Interpretive Letter 731, A National Bank Could Contract to Operate an
Electronic Toll Collector System, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 81-048 (July 1, 1996).




strongly hinted in the letter that up to 30% of CheckFree's revenues
could be derived from impermissible activities before the OCC would
require divestiture, but the statement is clearly not a commitment from
the OCC.
Use of SBICs for Minority Investments. A small business
investment company (SBIC) is a permissible investment for a national
bank under 12 U.S.C. section 24(seventh). A national bank may
invest up to 5% of its capital and surplus in a SBIC.9 ° As the BHCA
permits bank holding companies to acquire, without approval, shares
of the kinds, and in the amounts, eligible for investment by national
banks, the Federal Reserve Board allows such investments as well.
The Board does limit the amount of investment by a bank holding
company to approximately that which a national bank could invest. 9'
3. Joint Ventures
Regardless of the nature of the other participants, activities
proposed to be conducted through a joint venture structure may be
housed in either a bank or bank holding company subsidiary. As a
general rule, joint venture-type activity may not be conducted directly
in the bank, as the regulatory authorities are concerned about the bank
exposing itself to potential liabilities resulting from these ventures.
BHC Subsidiaries and Joint Ventures. Of all the possible
structures, the bank holding company subsidiary is perhaps the easiest
to accommodate to the joint venture. Under section 4 of the BHCA,
Federal Reserve Board approval is required regarding voting
investments of greater than 5% in any entity; the clear implication is
that the investment need not be a majority or controlling investment. 9'
Indeed, the Board orders dealing with participating in activities with
other entities regularly involve less than majority positions. The
Board has approved ventures involving multiple participants structured
as partnerships, limited partnerships, corporations, or joint ventures
under state law.
The Board does require that the venture limit its activities to
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 682(b) (1994).
91. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.111 (1998).
92. Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1994).
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those permissible for bank holding companies and their subsidiaries.93
In fact, the Board has routinely approved joint ventures in virtually
every area: data processing, trust activities, investment advisory
services, mortgage banking, financing and leasing activities, ATM
services, travelers checks, municipal securities brokerage, merchant
credit card processing, and holding real property obtained through or
in lieu of foreclosure. 94
The Board will often impose a series of commitments designed
to assure that the venture will be kept separate from the activities of
the other participants. Such conditions are common in joint ventures
with securities firms, for instance, where specific types of
management interlocks may be prohibited, joint employees may be
restricted, or physical separation of offices may be required. The
Board may require a commitment on the part of the bank holding
company to divest its interest in the venture on request of the Board.
When a non-bank venturer has control over the venture, the
Board has two concerns. First, the Board believes that it has the right
to supervise and examine all non-bank subsidiaries of a bank holding
company. Such supervision may be seen as intrusive by non-regulated
entities. Second, the Board wants to assure that the venture continues
to engage only in permissible activities. Accordingly, the Board will
reserve the right to examine the activities of the venture, and will in
fact do so on a routine basis.
On February 6, 1996, the Board permitted The Royal Bank of
Canada to acquire 20% of the voting stock of MECA Software,
L.L.C. 95 Royal Bank applied to join BankAmerica Corporation,
NationsBank Corporation, Fleet Financial Group, Inc., and First Bank
Systems, Inc. as owners of MECA. As discussed above, each of the
other banks owned their respective shares of MECA through bank
operating subsidiaries; Royal Bank, as a foreign bank, needed the
Federal Reserve's approval under Regulation Y.
In addition to its consumer financial software products and
related services, which easily fall within the parameters of Regulation
93. See id. § 1843(c)(8); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.21, 225.123 (1998).
94. See PAULINE B. HELLER, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW § 5.03[7]
(1986).
95. See Royal Bank of Canada, 82 Fed. Res. Bull. 363, 364 (Apr. 1996).
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y, 96 MECA had also developed and marketed various non-financial
software, including games, a computer security program, a medical
reference library, and a program providing basic legal forms.
Although these activities did not fall within the Regulation Y
limitations, the Board permitted MECA to keep, and indeed continue,
these activities. MECA and Royal Bank indicated that the revenues
from the impermissible activities were small, amounting to
approximately 7% of 1994 revenues, that MECA had no intention of
developing new non-financial software or to upgrade, enhance or
promote its current non-financial programs, and that the non-financial
portion of the company's business was expected to diminish over time.
Based on the limited nature of the activity, the Board approved the
acquisition and did not require the cessation or divestiture of the
impermissible activities.
On February 26, 1996, the Board approved an application of
Compagnie Financiere de Paribas to engage de novo in providing an
integrated software program to operators of digital mobile telephone
networks to perform billing and account-related services for customer
accounts.97 The software calculates bills based on data provided by the
telephone operator, such as date, time, duration, and destination of the
call, the customer's service contract, and individual account balances.
The company also provides general accounting services, such as
recording payments and balances, provides billing and settlement
services, and generates various related reports to the operator.
Part of the services performed consist of customer
identification and account information and the generation of certain
reports used by the operator to detect fraud. While these functions
would be performed only in connection with the data processing and
billing services, they are not within the list of "banking, financial or
economic" information described in Regulation Y. The Board,
however, allowed the company to engage in these activities, describing
them as a "relatively small part" of the operation of the company,
"incidental" to the primary billing and account functions to be
provided to the telephone operator.
Interestingly, and perhaps significantly, Paribas owns a
96. See 12 CFR § 225.1-200 (1998).
97. See Compagnie Financiere de Paribas, 83 Fed. Res. Bull. 348 (Feb. 1996).
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majority of France Telecom, the French national telephone operating
company, and owns 49.9% of Financiere Sema, a French investment
company that in turn owns 41.6% of Sema Group PLC, which
developed the software. It was not stated whether Sema offered the
product overseas. Sema proposed to establish the company as a
wholly-owned U.S.-based subsidiary to sell the software described in
the proposal.
The MECA and Paribas orders are extremely significant. The
limited authority to retain or engage in some modest non-financial
activities provides important "real world" opportunities for financial
institutions to participate more directly in the technological revolution
that will surely transform banking over the coming years.
The Board is occasionally concerned where the participants in
joint ventures are very large or the activities are to be extensive, that
the venture may result in an undue concentration of resources. In
Deutsche Bank/Fiat Credit,98 such a joint venture was disapproved,
even though the venture was strictly limited to otherwise permissible
activities. On the other hand, the Board recently approved a joint
venture between Wells Fargo and Nikko Securities," relating to trust
and investment management services, and earlier approved a joint
venture between Citicorp and Harrison Credit Corp.,' 00 a large
company engaged in the manufacture of farm equipment.
Finally, the Board has on occasion determined that a bank
holding company should limit its exposure to a joint venture, and has
disapproved certain ventures where it has determined that the
investment in a single venture or group of ventures is too great.101
Bank Service Corporations. Banks also have found that the
bank service corporation may be a useful vehicle for participating in
joint ventures with other bank and non-bank parties.'0° Recently banks
98. See Deutche Bank AG, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 449 (1981).
99. See Wells Fargo & Co., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 465 (1990).
100. See Citicorp, 69 Fed. Res. Bull. 648 (1983).
101. See Maryland National Corp., 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 271 (1979) (denying application
of bank holding company requesting permission for subsidiary to form joint venture with
General Electric Credit Corp. for purpose of leasing personal and real property).
102. A bank may not invest more than 10% of its capital in a bank service corporation,
and may not invest more than 5% of its assets in all service corporations. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1861(b) (1994). For this purpose, "invest" includes both equity investments and
extensions of credit. See id.
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have used bank service corporations to engage in merchant credit card
processing, trust activities and mortgage banking activities. 103
There are three basic types of bank service corporations:
(i) the "back office" corporation, performing check sorting, posting
and similar services for depository institutions, and for which no
approval is required; (ii) the "bank permissible" corporation,
engaging only in activities which the parent bank could engage, for
which the approval of the bank's primary federal regulator is required;
and (iii) the "4(c)(8)" corporation, engaging in BHCA permissible
activities, and for which the approval of the Federal Reserve Board is
required.'04 Although the list of bank permissible and 4(c)(8) activities
is virtually identical, there are occasions when it is easier and more
appropriate to go to the Federal Reserve than the OCC, particularly
when there are a number of bank participants operating under a
number of different charters, and the venture will operate on a broad
geographic basis.
Under the statute, a bank service corporation may only be
owned by one or more insured depository institutions. Even the
participation of a non-banking subsidiary of a bank holding company
in the direct ownership of a bank service corporation will destroy the
character of the entity and may call into question the ability of the
bank to participate through its service corporation. Accordingly, just
as with the national bank operating subsidiaries, banks will structure
the service corporation as a wholly owned subsidiary, or as a
subsidiary owned solely by banks, and the operating subsidiary will
then participate as a venturer in the venture, either as a partner in a
partnership, shareholder in a corporation, or in some other similar
capacity.
G. Antitrust Concerns
Federal and state antitrust laws may place limitations on
parties' other alliance activities, such as territorial and product-market
103. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter 697, A National Bank Was Able to Establish an
Operating Subsidiary to Serve as General Partner in a Partnership That Will Own a Trust
Company, [1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-012 (Nov. 15,
1995).
104. See 12 U.S.C. § 1861 et seq.
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allocations, exclusive dealing arrangements and concerted refusals to
deal. While neither the Department of Justice nor the Federal Trade
Commission has issued universal guidelines or policy statements
regarding the antitrust treatment of joint ventures, it is clear from the
agencies' enforcement activities that the agencies are willing to
consider efficiency justifications for joint ventures. Participants
should be aware that any horizontal agreements (agreements among
rivals) regarding price, the lowering of output or quality, allocation of
customers or territories, and agreements not to deal with certain
buyers except on advantageous terms may receive a quick invalidation
from the court. Some courts will also look to see if there is a less
restrictive alternative than a joint venture with anti-competitive effects.
Exclusive dealing concerns are at the core of the Department of Justice
claims against VISA and MasterCard. '0 Although antitrust issues are
not within scope of this article, they are of vital importance and must
be considered in planning any alliance.
V. CONCLUSION
Other things being equal, most financial services executives
and their counsel would prefer not to enter alliances, with their
complexity and potential for loss of control of strategic assets. The
trouble is that other things are not equal now among competitors (in
terms of marketing savvy, technical know-how or share of wallet) and
they are not likely to be equal in the future. The competitive forces
unleashed by deregulation and the revolution in information and
communications technology are here to stay and we have to deal with
them. This being the case, it is incumbent on the executive
managements and counsel of firms that want to survive to master all of
the available competitive tools at their disposal and to use them to best
effect.
This article has summarized a number of legal and business
issues that interested parties may study as they consider the use of
alliances to achieve their strategic goals. In our opinion, a necessary
105. See Lisa Fickenscher, Justice Dept. Probe Grows to Include Debit Cards, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 1, 1999, at 1; see also Lisa Fickenscher, American Express: We Hit Pay
Dirt With Global Card Distribution Push, AM. BANKER, Feb. 9, 1999, at 1.
[Vol. 3
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
next step in this process is to consider carefully what it is that is
fundamental to the firm's success. The primary obstacle to successful
participation in alliances, as discussed above, involves the issue of
control in various contexts. We believe that serious consideration of
alliances requires that participant managements and their counsel
narrow the control concern to the absolutely essential; in other words,
that they ask themselves; "What is it about us, exactly, of which we
fear the loss of control?" As noted above, bankers already are
participants in a number of alliances; expanding their use requires a
refinement of our understanding of where the line must be drawn
between what we are willing to share and what must be ours alone.
While the "fundamental asset" determination may differ
between financial institutions, we would suggest one particular asset
that "trumps" all others: the relationship of a bank with its customers.
As noted above, this "trusted institution" relationship is at the
foundation of a bank's franchise and is an asset unique to each
institution. After that crucial asset, we believe successful competitors
in the future will view virtually everything else as "negotiable."
While not all of everything else will be the subject of alliances, those
institutions that best figure out how to trade through alliances for what
they cannot do themselves in a superior manner will do the most to
shore up their relationships with customers.
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